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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT TARIFF 
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
PART 1 
Tariffs in General 
Chapter 1 
Statement of the Problem 
The object of this treatise is two-fold. First, it is 
an examination of the current reciprocal trade agreement pro-
gram of the United States. Second, it is an attempt to show 
the application of economic principles as they apply to two 
of the more recent agreements. 
In order to understand fully our current tariff policy~ 
it is necessary to study briefly the economic and political 
theory behind all tariffs; for a particular tariff policy is 
often the result of the current popularity of particular ar-
guments for protection or for f.ree trade. The recurring 
popularity of individual theories, however, is usually the 
result of the existing economic conditions and the influence 
of the political party in power. Therefore, a historical 
resume of our tariff policy will help to show why our pres-
ent program was adopted; for our present tariff policy is 
not merely an inspiration of Secretary of State Hull, but, 
as will be shown later, is the crystalization of many fact-
1========~~========~====-~==============~====================~==============-*-----l~~J-·---
ors, political, "diplomatic, and economic. The first part of 
this thesis, then, combines the eco~omic theory (largely the 
conclusions of the Classical School of Economists) and the 
politico-economic history of American tariffs as they effect 
our present tariff policy; together with a general analysis 
of the mechanics and accomplishments of this present policy 
of reciprocal trade agreements. 
It is also the aim of this thesis to show specifically 
the application of the economic principles developed above to 
two of the more recent trade agreements. All of the agree-
ments necessarily have their own peculiarities arising out of 
the nature of the goods in question and the political impor-
tance of the respondant country. However, the philosophy be-
hind all the agreements is, in general, the same; therefore 
a study of two recent trade pacts will disclose the purposes 
and mechanics of all reciprocal trade agreements. 
Factors Determining Point of View 
In considering trade agreements, as in all economic 
problems, there are two points of view that must be consider-
ed. First, there is the long run social point of view which 
represents the view of the people as a whole; second, the 
short run individualistic point of view which represents the 
view of one or a small group of people. 
Since the effect of tariff regulations on a region of-
ten varies greatly from each of these approaches, it will be, 
perhaps, expedient to define these terms more exactly. The 
long run point of view means a period of time long enough to 
allow economic laws and principles to come to fruition. Thus, 
the length of time may vary from one moment to any number of 
years depending upon what artificial factors interfere with 
the operation of economic laws. The short run means the con-
ditions as they exist at a particular moment in a given mar-
ket. 
Here it might be mentioned that the long rtm applica-
tion of economic laws in the field of foreign trade is so in-
terwoven with artificial factors of one kind or another that 
it is impossible to show historically the exact workings of 
these theories. Therefore it is only by abstruse reasoning 
that the broader, more far-reaching effects of trade agree-
ments can be shown. Even then the conclusions can be no more 
than mere generalizations. 
One further factor in determining our point of view 
rests not so much with the goods exchanged as with the indivi-
duals involved; in discussing tariffs we must bear in mind 
that trade is not an end in itself, but merely a means to an 
end. Goods and services are not desired for the sake of pos-
session or trade, but rather to satisfy wants and desires 
manifest in human beings. The goal of all economic planning, 
then, is concerned primarily with the satisfaction of these 
wants and not in the production of goods. Since, insofar as 
material goods are concerned, the satisfaction of these wants 
involves the consumption of the goods; we must be es.pecially 
--
cognizant of the effect of tariff policies on the consumer. 
n.As individuals our interest lies in the maintenance of the 
most favorable possible relation between the volume and cost 
of production and the remuneration we receive for our services; 
in other words, in having available the maximum supply of de-
sirable commodities which we can acquire by surrendering the 
minimum amount of purchasing power. 11 ?!-
Definition of Terms 
The word tariff is derived from the Old French word 
tarife~Hf meaning nraten from which th~ French have got their 
word for rate, tarif • .At a later date the word began to ap-
pear in other languages: in Spanish, tarifa means "price 
listtt or 11 rate booktt; in Arabic ta 1rif means 11notification 11 ; 
in Italian tar.iffa means "price list 11 ; and in Portuguese, 
tarifa-3(--:l--;:- means schedule. The word has come into general use 
in the English language to mean-lHHHl-
1. 11.A schedule, system, or scheme of duties imposed by a 
government on exports or, especially, imports. 
2. The duty, or rate of duty, imposed in a tariff. 
3 • .Any schedule or system of rates, charges, etc. 11 
A tariff law of the United States is a revenue measure 
or-iginating in t:Qe House of Representatives (since it is a 
1~ 11 Trade Barriers and Their Effects on the ·Consumer" 
.Alexander V. Dye - The Annals, July, 1938, page 22 
':lHl-GoMroy Frederic, Dictionaire de 1' ancienne langue fran-
caise, volume 2, page 649 
?(--~·-l*'Dictionary of Tariff Information, pages 718-719 
?HHH<Webster 1 s Shorter Dictionary, Springfield 1927 
l~ 
--======*================================================*====== 
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revenue bill) and approved by the President, as are all other 
bills. Such laws are, in effect, a statement of the circum-
stances under which goods may be brought into this country. 
Such a law includes a list of the articles that may be brought 
into this country, subject to duties and the rates of these 
duties, a list of the articles that may be imported free of 
duty, and a codification of the regulations necessary torotain 
enforcement of the law. 
The rates to be assessed against dutiable goods may be 
classified according to the mechanics of computing them or 
according to the economic result hoped for from the duty. 
Classified according to the basis of computing, there are ad 
valorem, specific, compound, and mixed rates. An ad volorem 
rate is a duty levied on the value of the commodity, a speci-
fie rate is applied to the quantity of a commodity, and a com-
pound rate combines both an ad valorem and a specific duty, 
and a mixed duty combines a compound and either an ad valorem 
·or a specific duty.?<-. 
An ad valorem rate has the advantage of simplicity, for 
it is much simpler for a legislature to set a flat rate based 
on value than to set up the minute classifications necessary 
for effective specific rates. However, an ad valorem rate is 
apt to provide less protection when protection is really need-
ed. That is; when foreign goods are cheap, the duty will be 
low and less protection will be provided for the domestic man-
ufacturer unless there is a corresponding drop in domestic 
~!-Dictionary of Tariff Tnforma tion, pages 486 - 487 
13 
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prices. The real danger here lies in the discrepancy in domes-
tic and foreign prices brought about by exchange fluctuations 
which may give the foreign competitor an unfair advantage or 
it may keep him out of the market altogether. A further dis-
advantage in this type of duty lies in that fact that it is 
particularly subject to evasion~ There is always the danger 
of undervaluation, since (1) there is a certain subjective 
. element in the determination of values, (2) complete informa-
tion regarding value is not always obtainable, and (3) great 
quantities of goods are imported to sell for what they will 
bring, thereby establishing no equitable value for assessing 
the duty. 
There are also certain disadvantages in specific du-
ties, whic4while perhaps not so serious, do make possible in-
accuracies and unfair practices. It is possible for importers 
to classify goods according to shades or gradations that will 
allow the goods to come in under a lower tarfiff. Again, spe-
cific duties make no allowance for changes in values. Perma-
nent changes in price may defeat the purpose of a particular 
tariff, since the amount of the tariff derived will not vary 
with these changes in the price of the goods. That is, as the 
value of the imported commodity increases a specific duty will 
be a relatively smaller item of cost and will therefore pro-
vide less protection. 
A compound duty is sometimes used in an attempt to mini-
mize the disadvantages of specific and ad valorem rates, and 
_lL. ____ _ 
-- --
to provide a more stable rate. 
In a compound rate the ad valorem factor is intended 
to apply to high priced goods that were classified with cheap-
er goods in the application of the specific rate. The spe-
cific- factor in the rate is intended to set a minimum cost 
for imported goods and to prevent undervaluation. An objec-
tion to this type or duty is that i~ involves maintaining the 
administrative procedure and detail required for both specific 
and ad valorem rates. 
From a fiscal point of view there· are revenue and pro-
tective tariffs. At one time in our history tariff duties 
amounted to approximately 70% of our national ~incgme, and con-
sequently the revenue aspect was very important. Today, how-
ever, such revenues amount to something less than 2% of the 
federal "in.cgm:e~ and, with a few exceptions, the income aspect 
is of little importance in determining rates. 
From the standpoint of protection tariffs may be classi-
fied into compensatory, countervailing and anti-dumping duties. 
A pure compensating duty is a charge against foreign processed 
goods equal to a duty paid by American manufacturers on the 
raw material involved. For example, if there were a duty on 
raw wool of 10~ per pound; the theory of a compensatory duty 
would require a tariff on all wool products equal to 10~ per 
pound on the wool content of the product. The purpose of this 
type of duty is to p~event duties on raw materials from handi-
capping domestic manufacturers. the exact computation and ap-
15 
plication of this type of duty presents some perplexing prob~ 
lems. For instance in the above problem it would be impossi-
ble to determine the exact equivalent weight of the raw wool 
in each type of imported cloth. Raw wool shrinks ~s much as 
70% in washing, 6% drawing, 2% in weaving and the cloth may 
stretch or shrink in the finishing operations. Again an in-
definite amount of the wool may have found its way into by-
products. A pound of cloth may easily have required 2 to 5 
pounds of the grease wool on which the raw material duty is 
levied. This error is, however, more apparent than real for 
pure compensatory rates are rare; they are usually accompan-
ied by an additional rate entirely for protection. 
A countervailing duty is an import duty equal to and 
intending to offset an export bounty or other government aid 
extended by the exporting country. All our tariff acts since 
1890 have included provisions for assessing countervailing 
duties as is deemed necessary. According to section 303 of 
our present ·tariff act, the Secretary of the Treasury has the 
right to determine or estimate the net amount of any neces-
sary countervailing duty, proclaim the duty in effect, and 
make all necessary ~ngements for its collection. 
Anti-dumping duties are designed to prohibit the dis-
posal of foreign goods in our domestic market for less than 
their foreign prices. Goods are dumped by foreign governments, 
cartels, or mass production industries for various reasons. 
Chief among them being to secure the savings of mass produc-
16 
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tion methods in a decreasing cost industry, to dispose of a 
temporary over-stock without upsetting home conditions, to 
penetrate into a new market, or to eliminate or forestall com-
petition. Dv~ping necessitates some degree of monopoly con-
trol at home else there would be no advantage in selling in 
foreign markets at a lower price. 
The following graph explains the advantages of the dump 
ing and the determination of the required duty in a decreasing 
cost industry. 
/ 
1-•~>r----------'---------------\----,----~ 
) 
Let us assume that the accompanying graph represents 
the market for X commodity in a foreign country. Now, let us 
further assume that a foreign manufacturer has enough control 
over his raw materials to enable his selling his cormnodity for 
$3.00 per unit; that is, he has a partial monopoly. This will 
provide him with a profit of (ABC D~) i. e. 50i@ unit on 
500 units or $2o0'.. If the manufacturer were able to dispose 
of 1,000 units he could produce then for $1.50 @ unit (E G H J~ 
This would provide him with a profit of (A B FE) i. e. ~~1.50 
on the 500 units sold at home or $750., providing the remain-
ing 500 units could be sold in some other market for their 
cost of $1.50. Stating the same condition another way the 
profit on the 500 units sold at home would be large enough to 
absorb the entire cost of the 1,000 units produced and whateve 
the remaining 500 units brought in another market would be 
clear profit. 
If, then, the American costs and demand were at all com 
parable to the foreign market; the foreign producer could un-
dersell American manufacturers. He could afford to sell for 
what the goods would bring. To combat this situation we have 
an anti-dumping tariff which can be applied in an amount equal 
to the difference between the domestic and foreign selling 
prices. If, in the above problem, the foreign producer were 
~· dump~ng his surplus 500 units in thi~ country to be sold for 
cost the anti-dumping duty would be ($3.00-$1.50,) $1.50 per 
unit. The law, apparently always provides a greater duty than 
18 
is necessary to prevent dumping. In the above problem~ for ex-
ample~ any duty over $1. would have prevented dumping, since 
such a duty would reduce the foreignerts total profit to $250.;, 
($750.-$500.;) the amount earned before the dumping was started 
The·re are some gains of large scale production, such as in-
creased employment, that do not appear in the profit itself and 
might justify mass production at slightly less total profit. 
This is~ perhaps, what our government had in mind when it set 
the anti-dumping duty so high, for as has been shown in the 
above problem a duty 2/3 of the required amount should suffice. 
The last economic aim of a tariff, but one of ever in-
creasing importance, deals with government regulation of com-
merce and industry and with the diplomatic relations between 
countries. Since these two subjects are fundamental to our 
present tariff policy they will be more fully discussed in the 
following chapters. It is enough, for the present, to indi-
cate the part that a particular tariff policy may play in de-
termining the direction of these two aspects of foreign trade. 
The imposition of a tariff has come to mean more than 
the mere scheduling and collection of duties; for, as has been 
suggested, a tariff is one means of controlling the industrial 
and commercial relations between countries. This element of 
government control in commerce dates from the days of mercan-
~: tilism and has developed from the ability of the government 
to impede through increased duties certain types of trade. Or, 
on the other hand, to encourage trade in certain goods by grant 
======~~======================================·-=--==~~============~==~=== 
ing rebates or bounties or by limiting competition. Even be-
fore this age of extreme nationalism, nations always founded 
more or less distinct entities interested almost solely in 
their own perpetuation, the welfare of their own members, and 
the maintenance of their own standards, customs and ideals. 
Government regulation of commerce is, in part, a method of at-
taining these purely nationalistic ends. In the long run this 
br.oader aspect of tariffs is. more far-reaching, for it will 
have a far greater effect upon the welfare of the nation than 
the mere inciden~e of the tariff burden. 
The extreme nationalism that has developed in many coun-
tries in recent years has had a fundamental effect on trade anc 
consequently on tariffs. In foreign countries it has fettered 
trade by embargo, quota restrictions, high tariffs and exchangE 
agreements. In the United States there are those who depre-
cate the importance of foreign trade and suggest a policy of 
isolation. They believe that international tension and war 
are the direct result of economic imperialism: The fight for 
and exploitation of foreign markets and the friction caused by 
international loans and investments. They believe that we 
should retreat from foreign trade and its complications and 
depend on our domestic producers and our home market. There 
are others in this country who believe in an increase in for-
~ eign trade and an inter-dependency among nations as a safe-
guard against war. Each of these schools of thought have had 
some effect on our tariff policies. The extent and exact na-
ture o:f their influence is the subject o:f another chapter. 
A Confusion o:f Terms 
The loose use o:f the terms 11:free trade 11 and 11 removal 
o:f barriers" has caused a great deal o:f confusion and misun-
derstanding as to their real meaning. At the time o:f David 
Hume and Adam Smith :free traders were those Who were opposed 
to the excessive governmental interference with :foreign trade 
at that time. This theory of :free exchange was :further devel-
oped by such writers as David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and 
John Elliot Cairnes. With the passing o:f time the connotation 
o:f the term has changed so that as it is customarily used to-
day 11:free trade 11 means that exchange between countries shall 
take place without measures that cause i;ihe domestic produc-
tion o:f articles which, in the absence of restriction, would 
be imported. "It does not mean that there shall be no duties 
and no restrictions. The imposition of revenue duties on arti 
cles that would not be made at home e:v.en after the duties have 
been imposed (on tea or coffee, for example) is not inconsis-
tent with the principle of free trade. Neither is the imposi-
tion of duties on other articles, if an internal tax o:f pre-
cisely the same rate is levied on these articles when made 
within the country. 11 ~~ 
A variation o:f this mixing of terms is :found especially 
in the writings on trade agreements. When an advocate or an 
opponent of trade agreements speaks o:f nbreaking down the bar-
~~Taussig_, F. W. Cyclopedia o:f American Government 
• 
e\ .. 
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riers of foreign trade, 11 he means removing SOI\le barriers so 
that trade may flow more freely without abandoning control. 
He does not imply that trade should be unco~trolled. Govern-
mental controls on foreign trade have become firmly establish-
ed. Curr.ent writings deal not with the advisability of main-
taining these controls, but merely with advi_,sabili ty of allow-
ing more goods to enter into foreign exchange. 
22 
Chapter 2 
The Theory of Protection 
One of the chief causes of conflict is that population~ 
c· 
and therefore wants, tend to increase faster than the availa-
ble· supply of goods. From an individual point of view, those 
individuals who are better able to ada:pt themselves to exist-
ing conditions tend to supplant those who will not or cannot 
readily adapt themselves. Those individuals who can fit them-
selves to their envivonment arid make the most of it are the 
ones that will 11 come out on top. 11 In dealing with nations, 
o± 
however, adaptJon to environment is not the only objective. 
The United States, for example, has set up certain ideals and 
standards that have become an end in themselv-es irrespective 
of their effect on total national efficiency. These ideals of 
recreation, leisure time, a high standard of living, and so 
forth may or may not be compatible with maximum national ef-
ficiency. Since~ on the whole, these ideals do lead to a net 
increase in production, it is possible that we could increase 
our efficiency without sacrificing our ideals. Insofar as we 
are able to do this, our production cannot be supplanted by 
nations that are more interested in efficiency than welfare. 
It is possible, however, that a stage may be reached 
where, in order to maintain our production, it will be neces-
sary to apply protective measures or to lower those standards 
23 
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not conducive to our greatest productive effieiency. It is 
at this point that the advocates of a protective tariff claim 
that protection is the only means of protecting the n.American 
way of living. 11 The validity of this concept and the prob-
lems that a tariff program entails will be the subject of the 
remainder of this chapter. 
Problems Created by Tariffs 
Perhaps the easiest approach to a discussion of the 
tariff problem will be to consider the more common arguments 
advanced by protectionists and free traders. Using these ar-
guments as an outline, we will have cleared the ground for a 
more intensive analysis of current tariff policies. 
Before studying the protectionist-free trader contro-
versy, however, it might be well to state some of the problems 
that must be met in determining the validity of any trade poli 
cy. These questions involve to some extent a choice on the 
part of statesmen between a lowering of national standards, an 
increase in national efficiency or the adoption of protective 
measures. 
Since all trade is reciprocal by nature, the pro·sp:eri ty 
of foreign countries must be considered. If they are to con-
sume our exported goods, they must be prosperous to be able to 
pay for them. This point must be kept in mind when duties are 
levied against their exports~ If foreign trade is to run 
smoothly, a spirit of cooperation and friendliness between na-
tions is essential. Here again, this fact must be kept in 
25 ======~~============-~-----~------~---~-----============================~~==~= 
mind when duties are levied against a foreigner's goods. 
The questions involving social conditions bear more 
directly on the advisability of protecting our standard of liv-
ing by tariffs. Diversification of industry, according to 
Alexander Hamilton, leads toward a higher type of society. 
However, such diversification necessitates the curtailment of 
those industries having a comparative advantage and therefore 
it results in decreased total productive efficiency.. In the 
interests of national welfare it might be advantageous to tax 
those domestic industries requiring poor working conditions 
with a deleterious effect on the morale of the employees. Now 
the free importation of these same products would amount to a 
bounty on imports in the interest of national welfare. The 
advisability of such a condition is one of the questions to 
be answered in establishing tariffs. Free competition tends 
to concentrate population in urban areas and in limited agr~-
cultural areas. Protection tends to disPerse the population 
over a wider area since it encourages the exploitation of a 
greater variety of resources. The question here is to what 
extent is dispersion of population desirable over the accom-
panying decrease in efficiency? One last social consequence 
of tariffs is the question of the equality of income and the 
creation of monopolies. Free trade may create a geographical 
monopoly while protection may, under certain conditions, creat 
a domestic monopoly. By the same reasoning equalities of in-
comes can be effected by tariffs or the lack of tariffs. 
• 
There are also certain economic questions to be met in 
determining the advisability of tariffs. For example, the 
most economical development of natural resources can take placE 
only where free trade will allow a maximum market and complete 
development of a comparative advantage. On the other hand, 
however, protection will aid in the development of other re-
sources not profitable under free trade. Steadiness of em-
ployment is a factor maintaining our national ideal of a high 
standard of living. Now, where there is a dove-tailing of two 
seasonal industries employing the same lahor; a tariff may be 
used to protect a weak industry in order to maintain steady 
employment for labor of the other industry. The point becomes 
more important when one realizes that there is some degree of 
seasonality to all industry, and that the process of joint use 
of the same labor has been developed to a high degree in some 
very seasonal industries. Another question to be considered 
is the effect of a tariff on other in,dustries using the taxed 
material. It is possible that the additional cost to the se-
cond industry might be just enough to off-set its comparative 
advantage. If this were so, then the protection and mainte-
nance of a weak industry would result in seriously handicap-
ping the production of a profitable commodity. One further 
problem to be faced in establishing a tariff is the necessity 
for allowing methods for the payment of international obliga-
tions. In the long run debts arising from interest, loans, 
or trade accounts must be paid for by goods. All of these 
--
problems diplomatic, social and economic have given rise to 
the arguments for protection discussed below. 
Less Important Arguments for Protection 
Perhaps the easiest approach to a discussion of the tar 
iff problem will be to consider the more common arguments ad-
vanced by protectionists. Using these arguments as an out-
line, we will have cleared the ground for a more intensive an-
alysis of our current tariff policies. 
Some outmoded mercantilistic beliefs still survive as 
arguraents for protective tariffs. The following arguments are 
of this type and can be disposed of in short order for they do 
not apply particularly to the subject at hand nor are they any 
longer the arguments used to any great extent in this country 
for the advancement of any tariff. 
1. Favorable balance of trade theory 
2. Creation of new home markets 
3. Protection of infant industries 
4. War economy (National self-sufficiency) 
Since money will flow into a country that has a favora-
ble balance of trade, it is thought that the resulting increase 
in prices will bring a prolonged period of prosperity. Such 
thinking is, however, in direct contrast to the basic economic 
principle that in the long run imports must equal exports. 
Suppose, for example, that this country has had an excess ex-
port balance for a number of years. Money, in one form or an-
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other, has flowed into this country, thus reducing the total 
volume of money in circulation in other countries. This will 
in turn produce a reduction in their price level, for the total 
goods in a region will exchange for the total money in that re-
gion. Carrying that principle into this country, where we had 
an export excess, prices would rise. This is overlooking, of 
course, the artificial obstacles in this country such as the 
depression and gold sterilization that would tend to delay the 
operation of the principle. Now, however, this country with 
its high prices will become a costly market in which to buy; 
the others will be cheap markets. The balance of trade will 
then swing over to the other side of the perfect balance. To 
maintain a "favorable" balance we would be obliged to resort 
to a continuous raising of import tariffs, for foreign coun-
tries would raise their tariffs on our goods to offset their 
unfavorable balance of trade. It is obvious that such a pro-
cedure cannot be maintained indefinitely, for eventually we 
must be paid for our exports. The adjustment might take some 
time, of course, because gold shipments, foreign investments 
and increasffidebts due us would, among other things, tend to 
delay the change. This is precisely the problem of the United 
States due to a-favorable balance of trade for a number of 
years. As will be shown later wear~ now the worldTs largest 
creditor nation and one of the arguments for reciprocal trade 
agreements is that they will enable foreigners to pay us for 
our interest, loans and merchandise exports. 
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From the short run point of view of the individual, an 
excess of exports may be desirable, for many industries would 
be operating at capacity production. However, as was shown, 
such a condition could not exist for long.· If an attempt is 
made to maintain a balance of exports by increased tariffs, 
the economic status of the individual is not as favorable dur~ 
ing this period as it may appear on the surface. The increased 
tariffs will have brought high cost producers into the field. 
The. consumer will then have to give a larger part of his money 
income to obtain the same amount of goods. His real income 
will, therefore, be reduced. 
From the long run point of view the theory that a new 
market has been created by the exclusion of tariffs is falla~ 
cious. What has happened is that one market has been substitu-
ted for another. It may be true that, as far as one comrnodity 
or_industry is concerned, a new market has been created; for 
the market which formerly was supplied by foreign producers is 
now being supplied by domestic producers. But bearing in mind 
the fact that imports must be paid for by exports, the purchas-
ing power of the country or region which formerly supplied the 
export market for our commodities will be reduced. Other domes 
tic producers will, therefore, lose a market for their commodi-
ties. Even if the former suppliers of that commodity did not 
purchase any of our exported products, to assume an extreme 
case, their purchasing power will be reduced to the extent that 
they will not be able to purchase the commodities of other coun 
tries. The purchasing power of these other foreign countries 
will then be reduced and they will not be able to buy the com-
modities we are normally capable of exporting. 
From the standpoint of the laborer, it may appear as 
though he were in a better economic position than he was form-
erly, for he is now called upon to produce commodities that 
were formerly imported. But a more intensive view will dis-
credit even this argument. The foreign producers could under-
sell the domestic producers only because their costs of produc-
tion were lower. They could therefore offer. the goods at a 
lower price. The imposition of a tariff or the raising of tar-
iffs will call into the market producers whose costs are rela-
tively high for it will now become profitable for them to pro-
duce these commodities. The consumer--including the worker--
will have to give up a greater share of his money income to 
obtain the same amount of commodities. Result--real income is 
reduced. 
Protectionists have often advanced the theory that in-
fant industries should be given protection while young. They 
suggest a duty not to exceed twenty-five per cent nor to endure 
more than twenty or thirty years. Their reasoning being that 
if a higher duty or a longer period is necessary~ it is proba-
ble that the industry will never develope a comparative advan-
tage. A great deal can be said for this proposal, although 
there is some question as to its practicability. There is, 
for example, the problem of determining which industries can 
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develop comparative advantages. Again, it is doubtful whether 
tariff' protection represents the correct method of' protection. 
Tariff' regulations once established have a tendency to stick. 
If' a new industry were given protection, it would be difficult 
to abolish the tariff' later. Even if the industry had devel-
oped a comparative advantage, there would be individual high 
cost producers who would suffer when the tariff' was removed. 
The clamoring of these individuals would, without doubt, over-
shadow the real profit of' the industry as a whole. Since all 
producers in this particular industry would lose with the re-
moval of the tariff', they would do their best to camouflage 
their profits. Of' course, if' subsidies were given to the in-
dustry, the condition would not be so serious. The taxpayer 
would not be willing to donate any substantial part of the mon-
ey he pays as taxes to private industry for any extended length 
of' time. He probably would not object to a high tariff' because 
he would not realize that it would be merely a roundabout meth-
od of' subsidizing the industry. In short, the immediate cost 
of producing an industry having a comparative advantage may 
more than offset any ultimate gain, although this is not neces-
sarily the case. 
The last argument under this heading pertains to the 
possible necessity of a nation being self-sufficient during a 
war period. Although there is ·some basis for this argument, 
it is questionable whether or not it is worth the price. Con-
stant high tariff's, as insurance against war needs would re-
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quire high insurance premiums. The loss of real income occa-
sioned by high cost goods, while an indirect cost, would be 
tremendous. All goods we now import would cost more manufac-
tured here and the cost of goods now exported would increase 
for we could no longer export any of them. 
On the other hand, if a completely liberal policy were 
adopted the danger of war would be lessened. Each nation would 
be so dependent upon commodities from other nations that a war 
would· be too costly to finance. Thus, if all nations adopted 
a liberal policy, the danger of war would be largely averted 
by exactly the opposite policy from that which is now advocated 
Current Arguments for Protection 
The remaining arguments for protection are those that 
are now being used to great extent in this country to restrict 
reciprocal trade agreements. The ctirrent arguments may be log-
ically summarized as follows: 
1. Increase. in unemployment 
2. Lowering of wage levels 
·3. Lowe~ing of our standard of living 
From the long run viewpoint a lowering or removal of tar-
iffs will not increase unemployment. A lowering or removal of 
tariffs will have two effects. First it will reduce the price 
of certain commodities. The consumer will then have to give 
up a smaller amount of his money income to obtain the same a-
mount of goods. As the consumer has to give up a smaller a-
mount of his money income to obtain the goods, he will spend 
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the balance for other commodities. Secondly, the purchasing 
power of foreign countries will be increased. There will then 
be an increased demand for domestic products both in the for-
eign and domestic markets. To produce these commodities, the 
same if not more labor will be employed as was displaced by 
the lowering or removal of tariffs. 
It is the obvious results of the short run point of vie~ 
that form the crux of this argument. It is the real suffering 
of certain groups of workers and industries that over-shadow 
the ultimate buil distant benefits of tariff reductions. To 
quote directly from Taussig:* 11 0ne of the most persistent o.f 
economic errors is the.notion that employment is an end, not a 
means; and one o.f the hardest things to fasten in the average 
person's thinking is that the end to which employment should 
be directed is the increase of the national income--the total 
flow of consumable goods and of services.which constitutes the 
real revenue of thecomrnunity." 
It is quite possible that the individuals who produced 
the commodities upon which the.tari.ffs were reduced would not 
work .for some time, perhaps the rest o.f their lives. For when 
we say that the same or more labor will be reemployed, the pro-
ducers, for whose product the demand has increased, may call 
upon the reserve labor supply to produce the commodities. How-
ever, since at any one time it tends to be the more efficient 
labor that is employed, the individual laborers displaced stand 
-:~Taussig p. 511 "Principles of Economics 11 
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a better chance of being reemployed than those laborers already 
unemployed. The conwarative immobility of labor, even within 
one region, however, may make reemployment of the same laborers 
more difficult. The seriousness of this situation will be more 
fully discussed and illustrated in a following chapter by the 
trade agreements under consideration. 
The argument that a tariff enables American industries 
to keep wages at a high level has a~ways been very effective in 
this country. It was largely this point of view that brought 
about the tariff act of 1930 and it is now the main obstacle in 
the path of reciprocal trade agreements •. Perhaps the chief 
reason for the-prevalence of this argument is that people are 
again confusing money income with real income. They are pain-
fully conscious of the obvious results of lowering or removing 
tariffs, but they completely overlook the broader and more far-
reaching aspects of the probleme . To illustrate, the lowering 
of import duties in any particular field would mean that cer-
tain high cost producers must inmediately lower their operating 
costs if they are to stay in business. Since labor costs are 
often a more controllable expense than overhead or materials, 
it would be the laborers who would lose. This is the first 
and obvious result that blinds people from looking for further 
effects of the tariff reduction. If a little more thought were 
~ given to the subject, it would be seen that, while a certain 
amount of labor unquestionably suffers, it is usually only the 
marginal producer who must reduce wages. Nevertheless, some 
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producers or manu£acturing associations will lower wages for 
the psychological effect that it will have on the public. That 
is, it is an attempt to discredit the Federal Administration 
and its tariff policy. It is more likely, however, that there 
will be :a'. narrowing of profit margins or that attempts will be 
made to reduce other items of expense. If the industry in 
question ha·s no particular advantage and has prospered solely 
because of the tariff, the initial loss will be great. This 
is so because high wages in an industry of this type can be 
maintained only by keeping the tariff. In any situation but 
the last, it is not likely that wages will be reduced perman-
ently by the full amount of the tariff reduction. 
But here·aga±n we must remember that the consumer--in-
eluding the laborer--can now purchase the goods in question at 
a lower cost. His real income is then increased. This.does 
not mean that the real income of all labor ~s inc~eased, for 
that labor fonnerly employed by high cost producers will lose 
far more than they will gain. The country as a whole, however, 
will gain. Again, the importation of cheaper goods will mean 
eventually an increase in our exports and there will be a new 
foreign market. Thus, by lowering the tariff, industry is, in 
the long run, directed into the most productive channels. The 
.... 
country has decreased the production of high cost goods and in-
creased the production of goods which it manufactures more ef-
fectively, thus increasing the amount of goods or real income 
of its people. This,· then, is the general result of the effect 
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of lower tariffs on wages. From the short run viewpoint there 
will be industrial disturbance and hardship, but in the long 
run society will gain far more than it will lose. 
The question of a lower standard of living is closely 
associate~ with the question of wage scales and has been dis-
cussed under that heading. It need only be added here that an~ 
decrease in wages occasioned by lower tariffs will not affect 
our standard of living for the decrease in wages will be ac-
companied by a proportionate decrease in prices. It will mere-
ly mean that we will have fewer counters for use in exchange. 
Whether prices are high or low in this country makes no differ-
ence in the long run except for .the purchase of foreign goods. 
If wages and prices in this country are high, there is great 
advantage in buying foreign goods for their prices will be rel-
atively low. Conversely, if our wage and price level were low, 
there would be less advantage in purchasing foreign goods. 
This is so because the prices of foreign goods are governed by 
cost of.production in foreign countries and are not affected 
by price levels in this country. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis of 
the need for tariffs is that money wages need not necessarily 
be lower in an exporting country. This country exports over 
two billion dollars worth of goods annually ,~l- yet we also pay 
high money wages. The crux of the 'situation, then, is not dif-
ferences in wages paid, but in the effectiveness of the labor 
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expended. It is possible to maintain low prices in spite of 
high wages if labor is expended in those lines where it will 
be most productive. The greater productivity of labor in this 
country is attributable not so much to the superior ability of 
our labor as to the great abundance of natural resources, up-
to-date capital equipment, and superior management of produc-
tive forces. In short, we have a comparative advantage in many 
industries which allows us to produce and sell goods in foreign 
markets at low prices without lowering our own wage scale. 
The trend of the changes in the comparative advantage 
in various fields in the United States can be traced from the 
following figures.* In 1880, forty percent of our commodity 
exports consisted·of manufactures as compared to sixty-five 
percent today. Again, in 1880 we imported about twenty percent 
of our raw material used in manufacturing; today we import a-
bout thirty-five percent of such materials. These figures show 
that, while we may have a comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of raw materials, we now have a greater comparative ad-
vantage in the producing of manufactured goods. Our advantage 
now depends more upon skill and organization than upon natural 
resources. But this skill and administrative ability is crys-
tallized in, and depends upon, new inventions and improved 
machinery. We cannot be deprived of natural resources_, but 
~- modern efficient machinery can be copied. If we are to main-
tain our comparative advantage in this field, we must continu-
~*"Gemmill p. 474 
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ally strive to improve our machinery and thereby the errective-
ness or our labor. It is this condition that has caused the 
proposed Czechoslovakian trade agreement to appear such a men-
ace to our shoe industry. For, as will be shown later, the 
Czechoslovakian shoe manuracturers have stolen a march on the 
domestic shoe manufacturers in the rield or modern equipment. 
Protection as an Aid to Social Welrare 
Under certain circumstance protection may maintain or 
improve a nation 1 s atandard of living. In the case of an in-
rant industry this possibility was pointed out. This inrant 
industry argument is sometimes expanded as a program to promote 
the welfare of the whole nation. The idea was first promulga-
ted by Friedrich List, a German economist. List recognized the 
"importance of the transition of nations in the temperate zone 
from one stage or civilization to another. At the time or his 
writings Germany and the United States were just developing in-
to the industrial stage. It was his contention that these two 
countries were destined to be industrial states and any plan 
that directed their economic activities along this line would 
in the long run be economically justifiable. The free trade 
program endorsed by England was best suited to her needs for 
she had already arrived at the final or industrial stage or 
economic development. But merely because England was then bet-
ter equipped for manuractures was no reason that Germany and 
the United States would not advance to the industrial stage if 
not hampered by British competition. List believed that the 
nation could be educated industrially, changing the economic 
;- life of' the whole mass o:f the people. Such a program if' suc-
cessful would have tremendous effect on the cultural life and 
the standard of' living of' the entire nation. 
The success of' such a plan depends, as in the case of' an 
infant industry, on the possibility of' the country ever devel-
oping comparative advantages in several lines of' endeavor. Wit' 
this plan the protectionist is on more tenable ground for he 
recognizes that nations of' the temperate zone do not possess 
static societies, but are in a process of' continual evolution 
from pastorjal to industrial states. The problems of' changing 
societies require different treatment than those of the static 
order assumedby free-traders. In their broadest sense all pro 
tection arguments are similar to this one in that they aim for 
an increase in the welfare of' the people. Unlike this theory, 
however, the other arguments tended to benefit one particular 
group as against the nation as a whole. 
Another argument of protectionists of' a somewhat differ-
ent view is that once protection has been given it should never 
be withdrawn. After large investments of capital and invest-
ments or labor in skill, the loss arising from lower tariff's 
should not be tolerated. The mere existence of protection is 
an invitation to labor and capital to invest in the protected 
field. It is an implicit promise that such investments will 
continue to be protected. 
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It is true that the drastic lowering or complete with-
drawal of' a tariff' would create innneasurable suffering and loss. 
- However, the solution to this problem lies in the gradual re-
duction of' tariff's. No free-trader advocates innnediate removal 
of' duties; that would be undeniably unfair. His recommendation 
is that tariffs should be lowered as each unit of' production 
wears. out. They should be lowered at a rate f'ast enough to dis 
courage new investments in an uneconomic endeavor, but not so 
f'ast that present investments are too seriously affected. 
Arguments f'or Free Trade 
It is not necessary to explain fully the arguments f'or 
f'ree trade, since most of them have been used in analysing the 
various theories supporting protection. It will be sufficient 
merely to present the chief' arguments in summarized f'orm f'or 
easy reference. Free trade is predicated on the attainment of' 
the greatest possible efficiency and therefore the maximum pro-
duction of' goods. Any regulation that tends to increase the 
available quantity of goods t~nds to raise standards of living; 
and, conversely, an action that tends to limit the amount of' 
commodities has a detrimental effect on social welfare. Free 
trade encourages geographic division of labor and therefore en-
courages efficiency. Tariff's, on the other hand, tend t-o re-
~ duce total production and increase costs by diverting capital 
~·-· ~--·--·­
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into industries having little ... or_no comparative advantage. 
iff's may create trusts and monopolies if' control of the protect 
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tion. The report made much of the homemarket argument in an 
attempt to reconcile the differences of the South with the 
North and West. The report also discussed the need of military 
self-sufficiency and the problem our infant industries faced, 
in meeting the competition of the established industries of 
Europe. At that time the report had little effect on the Na-
tion as ·a whole, because the agricultural and commercial in-
terests were the prevailing interests of the day. 
The changes in duties between 1789 and 1812 were de-
signed to obtain the maximum revenues. In 1812 the rates were 
doubled to provide revenue for the war. Between our own war 
and the European Wars of Napoleon, foreign competition was al-
most entirely cut off. With this stimulus, far more important 
than the double tariff rates, American industries greatly ex-
panded to meet the new demand. With the close of hostilities 
in 1815, however, the great increase in European goods threat-
e·ned to ruin our infant industries. This condition, coupled 
with the need of revenues to meet the war debt, prepared the 
way for the first protective tariff, that of 1816. For this 
tariff Secretary of the Treasury Dallas suggested three classi-
fications of goods. First, those goods that could be supplied 
by domestic man~acturers were to be provided with full pro-
tection; second, those goods which could be only partially sup-
plied by the home industries were to be provided with a lesser 
degree of protection; and finally, those commodities not manu-
factured at home were to be taxed for revenue purposes only. 
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The act as finally passed contained rates somewhat lower than 
those advised by Dallas. By the tariff act of 1824 the newly 
founded textile industry was the chief benefactor in spite of 
the concerted action of the South and the commercial East. 
The success of the textile interests in the 1824 tariff 
led to increasing demands for protection and culminating in 
the act of 1828, 11 the Tariff of Abominations." The excessive 
protection granted on raw materials by this act, was the re-
sult of unusual circumstances. In order to discourage protec-
tion, the law was drafted with protective rates on manufac-
tares but with such heavy duties on raw materials that it nulli 
fied any duties levied on manufactures. The plan was to bring 
the bill to a vote with as little debate as possible and when 
it was discarded, to unite the dissatisfied parties on a new 
low tariff. For some unknown reason the plan failed and the 
bill became law. This introduced, for the first time, compound 
duties and modified the principle of minimum valuation by the 
adoption of classes. Since this involved specific rates, it 
occasioned much undervaluation. The dissatisfaction of both 
the North and the South in the general character of this act 
and especially in some of its more irrational rates led to the 
act of 1832. This act removed some of the more serious objec-
tions, but it did not greatly lower the rates in general. The 
South, discouraged in its efforts to lower the tariffs, threat-
r""sso:l . 
ened to secede and in the same year South Carolina~ its rrNul-
lification Act" which was intended to make the acts of 1828 and 
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1832 inoperative in that state. In order to prevent impending 
conflict, the 11 Compromise Tariffrr of 1833 was passed, which 
provided for the biennial reduction of duties over 20% by 1942. 
The depression of 1837 together with the increased need 
for Gover~ment revenues brought about the tariff of 1842. This 
tariff was distinctly protective in nature as are most tariffs 
of a depression period. The revival of business and an excess 
in the treasury led to the tariff act of 1846. For the formu-
lation of this tariff, Secretary of the Treasury Walker recom-
mended the adoption of the following principles: 
1. No more money was to be collected than was neces-
sary for the efficient administration of the Government. 
2. Rates should not be higher than those necessary 
to obtain the maximum possible revenue. 
3. The maximum duty shall be imposed on luxuries. 
4. Ad valorem duties shall be substituted for all 
specific and minimum rates. 
5. The rates imposed shall be made to operate as 
equitably as possible throughout the _nation. 
The tariff as finally enacted was simple and concise and con-
tained comparatively low duties. This tariff remained in ef-
fect for eleven prosperous years. 
This long period of prosperity, however, decreased the 
interest in protection and, since the country as a whole was 
still opposed to protection, the tariff act of 1857 sponsored 
still lower rates. In fact, the rates averaged only 20% on 
dutiable or 16% on free and dutiable goods. The depression of 
1857 again caused a shortage of Government revenues and the 
act of 1860 was again definitely protective. With the seced-
ing of the Democratic South, the path was clear for the con-
tinual raising of duties for the duration of the war. The 
high tariffs of this period were of a countervailing nature, 
intended to offset the internal revenue taxes imposed on domes-
tic manufactures. During the period of the war and until 1870 
the rates on dutiable goods averaged about 48% and on free and 
dutiable goods about 44%. These duties, although only emer-
gency measures, continued after the close of the war for many 
reasons. The first taxes to be reduced were the more obvious 
direct ones. The high tariffs, being more indirect, remained. 
Again, the war caused the establishment of many new industries 
dependent on the tariff for their existence. The longer the 
delay in lowering the rates; the greater was need for protec-
tion. 
By 1870, the voice of the South was again beginning to 
be heard and the act of that date lowered some of the more ex-
cessive rates. This act.was followed by the act of 1872 which 
provided for a further horizontal reduction 6f 10% on all du-
ties. This tariff was formulated in such a way that future 
increases for revenue purposes were bound to act as increased 
protective measures. This was done by placing the great reve-
nue producers, tea and coffee, on the free list. This aim was 
accomplished by the panic of 1873 and the consequent need of 
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revenue. With returning prosperity came a new demand for low-
er tariffs and the act of 1883 granted some concessions in this 
direction. 
The campaign of 1888 was fought largely on the tariff 
question and the victory of the Republicans presaged the high-
er tariff of 1890. At this time the 11 pauper labor 11 and 1home-
market11 arguments came to the fore as important arguments for 
protection. This tariff also introduced reciprocal agreements. 
The democrats were in power when the Wilson Tariff of 1894 was 
passed, but this act represented only a moderate reduction in 
rates. This act apparently satisfied neither party and was su-
perseded by the !!Dingley Tariff 11 of 189'7. This tariff was de-
signed to protect manufactures but it also granted some protec-
tion to agriculture by the introduction of increased rates on 
raw wool. Provision was also made for the maintenance of the 
plan for reciprocity agreements instigated under the McKinley 
Tariff of 1890. The higher rates of this act were largely spe-
cific duties and were therefore partly offset by a period of 
rising prices. 
The Dingley Act remained in effect for 12 years, but by 
1909 it was considered obsolete in the face of changing condi-
tions. The 11 Payne-Aldrich Actrt resulted in a complete revisi 
of the tariff in which the rate was lowered on 584 and raised 
on 300 commodities. The net result, satisfactory to neither 
party, was a slightly lower tariff. The controversy concern-
ing this act centered largely on the trusts. It was thought 
that the trusts, protected by high tariffs, were largely re-
sponsible for the rising price level and the high cost of liv-
ing of the period. As a concession to this feeling, or a pro-
tection against more concerted action, the Republicans lowered 
their standards of protection. Scientific protection was now 
held to be such duties as would equalize the cost of produc-
tion between domestic and foreign producers allowing for a 
fair margin of profit. Although this argument has subsequent-
ly been used in other tariff controversies, it is economically 
indefensible. If the domestic and foreign costs on all goods 
equalized there would be no comparative advantage and there-
fore no international trade. If carried to the logical ex-
treme of exact equalization, it would defeat the purpose of 
all trade. 
In 1913, President Wilson called an extra session of 
Congress and the tariff question was immediately brought to 
the fore. The nunderwood TariffH of that year contained defin 
itely lower rates. The provisions of this act were, in gener-
al, as follows:* 
a. Considerable additions to the free list. 
b. Abolition of compensatory duties corresponding with 
the old rates on raw materials. 
c. Replacement of specific by ad valorem rates in many 
cases. 
d. Reduction of rates generally (most of the few in-
*F. W. Taussig Tar:i:ff History of the United States pp, 409-424 
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creases being to correct some evident error in the 
old law.) 
e. Application of the so-called 11 competitive 11 princi-
ple to rates intended to be protective. 
The outbreak of the Great War made it impossible to de-
termine just what effect this tariff would have had on American 
industry and commerce. The war provided a far greater degree 
of protection than any tariff and encouraged the uneconomic ex-
pansion of many industries to meet war n~eds. The Emergency 
Tariff of 1921 increased the rates on many agricultural pro-
ducts in order to continue the protection started by the war. 
It also provided for anti-dumping regulations and a qualified 
embargo on certain chemicals and dyestuffs. 
The 11Fordney-Mc0umber 11 Tariff of 1922 as is usual in 
post-war depression periods made permanent the policies of the 
Eraergency Act. High protection was granted to many war-stimu-
lated industries, to "key" and war-industries, and especially 
to agriculture which had been severely hit by the post war re-
cession. An important provision of this act was the power giv-
en to the president to adjust any duty by a maximum of 50% if 
it was found that the rate set by t~e act did not equalize the 
cost of production between the United States and competing for-
eign countries. Any change made under this flexible provision 
was to be based on an investigation and recommendation of the 
tariff commission. 
The agricultural interests of the country did not share 
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in the long prosperity period of the twenties. Once land is 
put under cultivation, it is apt to remain there, for a farmer 
will continue to cultivate his land as long as his return is 
greater than his actual monetary outlay. If the price of grai 
falls, a farmer is apt to plant more grain rather than less 
order to meet his fixed charges. This was the condition of 
over-expanded agricultural industries in the decade following 
the World War. The agricultural surpluses of those years de-
pressed prices and the farmers sought government aid through 
increased duties on farm products. On the other hand, there 
were certain groups that looked for a downward revis~on from 
the high rates of the 1922 act. They claimed that it was be-
coming increasingly difficult to collect interest and princi-
pal on foreign investments partly because of our protective 
policy. They also held that since the United States was the 
world's greatest creditor nation, it was for us to initiate 
procedings tending to reduce the entanglements and restrictions 
that had been hampering world trade since the close of the war. 
The ttHawley-Smoottt Tariff as finally passed on June 18, 1930 
made very few concessions and even increased many rates over 
the high duties established by the act of 1922 (see appendix 
schedule #Pl.) urt is not surprising, then, that during the 
torturous progress of debate over the thousands of items, there 
were received formal protests from thirty nations in regard to 
some two hundred proposed changes. 11 -lf-
-l~National Planning as Affecting Trade Barriers 11 The Annals of 
the American Academ • 28 
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Contrary to most depression periods, the depression of 
the early thirties provoked no great demand for higher tariffs. 
The serious decline in our export trade, the already extreme 
duties, and the fact that the depression was world-wide, were 
factors tending toward a reduction rather than an increase in 
duties. The first step toward the amelioration of these high 
rates was the instigation of reciprocal trade agreements. How 
ever, certain explanatory a~d descriptive material must first 
be presented before the full significance of the trade agree-
ment plan can be fully appreciated. This material, ineluded 
in the following sections, consists of an analysis of the 
causes of the current condition of world trade. 
Some Dangers of Isolation 
As a corollary to the history of our tariff it might be 
well to state the effect of these tariff policies on our inter-
national economic and financial relations. Until the mid-sev-
enties we had, generally, nunfavorable 11 trade balances. The 
rrfavorable rt merchandise balances from then until the World War 
represented payments on interest and amortization of foreign 
loans. The need for raw material and foodstuffs during the war 
and the dislocation of foreign industries after the war caused 
great out-pourings of American goods for European market-s. 
This tremendous increase in our foreign trade made us, virtu-
ally overnight, the world's greatest creditor nation. In 1914 
foreign investments in the United States amounted to between 
four and five billion dollars and American investments abroad 
totaled to about one-fourth of a billion dollars • .;~ By 1933 the 
foregoing conditions resulted in a complete reversal and we be-
came a net creditor for over twenty billion dollars • .;~-x- This 
tremendous credit was divided approximately one-half in port-
folio investments, i. e. stocks and bonds; and one-half in di-
rect investments by corporations in branches and subsidiaries. 
Until 1930 foreigners were able to buy more from us 
than we bought from them and still maintain huge interest pay-
ments due us simply because we increased our net investments 
abroad by over four billion dollars iri the preceding decade. 
However, the default of many bonds and the uncertainty of worlc 
conditions has led to a decrease in foreign investments. The 
high rates of the Hawley-Smoot tariff has led to reprisals a-
broad, further hindering international exchange of goods and, 
consequently, the payments due us for current accounts as well 
as past debi;;s. 
All this, together with our loss of foreign trade, fos-
tered the doctrine of self-sufficiency. It was advocated that 
we should escape from foreign entanglements that required con-
tinual adjustment of our domestic production. It was distrust 
and disappointment with world conditions that led to the de-
mand for some degree of self-sufficiency. Again, it was felt 
that self-sufficiency was a requisite of national planning, 
->~Fisk, !!Inter-Ally Debts 11 p. 307 
->H~Dunn, !!American Foreign Investments 11 p. 16 
.,HH~rrNational Planning As Affecting Trade Barriers 11 The Annals 
of the American Academy, July, 1938 p. 29 
i. e. such an institution as theN. I. R. A. Foreign markets 
and foreign sources of raw materials menaced all national plan-
ning. In a changing world agrarian countries supplying us with 
raw· materials and consuming our manufactures might develop into 
industrial countries causing us to seek new markets and new 
sources of ·raw materials and necessitating continual changes 
in our economic life. 
As an example of the necessary adjustments, our present 
loss of foreign trade has had a tremendous bearing on our na-
tional economy. One of the causes of the Great Depression was 
this adjustment to our produetion due to the loss of foreign 
outlets. The A. A. A. and other national planning legislation, 
although largely the result of over-expanded war industries, 
was also necessitated by foreign trade. 
From 1929 to 1932 there was a tremendous loss of for-
eign trade. Although the bulk of the loss was due to the world 
wide depression, the high tariff of 1930 was an important factoJ. 
The seriousness of this loss can readily be seen when one con-
siders that in 1929 20% to 50% of our staple products were ex-
ported and that by 1932 these ratios had ~rapped 3% to 32%.* 
Stated another way,** there were 360,000,000 acres devoted to 
crops in 1929; of this land, 210,000,000 acres or 58% were de-
voted to four crops, namely; cotton, tobacco, wheat and corn. 
These are some of the crops on which exports ran from 20% to 
50% of production. Thus a substantial part of our agricultural 
*see appendi~ - exhibit #13? 
**Trade Barriers and their Consequencestr The. Annals of the 
American Academy, July, 1938 p. 44 
land was tilled in anticipation and dependant upon foreign mar-
kets. 
It is important to note that this loss of trade is due 
to many causes of which the Smoot-Hawley tariff was but one, 
how ever, the part played by the tariff is important. The loss 
of these markets .has caused domestic surpluses which, in turn, 
has necessitated government regulation. 
The above figures do not accurately show existing con-
ditions, for they do not differentiate between the loss due to 
high tariffs, decrease in foreign purchasing power, and produc-
tion cont~ol. However, they indicate the condition that led 
Secretary of .Agriculture Wallace to say in 1934, nAmerica Must 
Choose. 11 America must choose between comparatively unrestrict-
ed commerce (that will, in the long run, help to adjust our ex-
port industries and obtain some degree of equilibrium between 
production and demand) and more government regulation. If, on 
the other hand, our foreign trade policy continues to hamper 
our export industries, more regulation that a new .A . .A . .A. will 
be needed. Government limitation of production leads directly 
to unemployment in that section or indirectly, through diver-
sified crops to unemployment in other parts of the country. 
The effect of limiting an export industry reverberates tl).rough-
out our whole economic system. Directly or indirectly all 
t1a types of industry are affected, and regulations will necessi-
tate further regulations. This condition in agriculture is 
analogous to other lines of production creating an economy of 
less rather than more goods. The need of foreign trade and 
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the regulation caused by an isolatic::m J;HDl::Lcy ilea-Q. in opposite 
directions. To increase or maintain ot.r stat.I,dard of living we 
must have an increase in both volume .and velo6it.y of exchange, 
an increase that can be brou~ht about pot bj p8lieies Df isola-
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tion and the consequent curtailrilent of @Xp_or'G.j_nd~stries, b:ut 
only by freer and more unrestricteCl trade. 
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Current International Trade Policies 
We have shown the development of our tariff policy to 
1930 together with the foreign trade problems created, in part, 
by this policy. Before carrying the story further, it will be 
helpful to describe the changes in the attitude towards .. inter-
national trade developed in foreign countries. This is neces-
sary since their trade policie~ together with their economic 
and political aspirations, have had a significant influence on 
our own trade policies. 
Self-Sufficiency and the New Imperialism 
The. post-war tendencies and policies of all poli'tical 
states have been Nationalistic. The last war made each natlon 
conscious of its dependence upon external .markets and the· in-
herent weaknesses consequent to such dependence. This in turn 
has led toward self-sufficiency. There are degrees of self-. 
sufficiency depending on the desired goal. The term may be 
advanced as an arg~ment for retreating from international en-
tanglements for the sake of peace (as in. the United States) 
or it may be an ideology of preparation for future conflicts 
(as in some European countries.) In either case self-suffi-
ciency does not mean complete economic isolation. The term 
means the attainment of that position where, if necessity arose 
a minimum quantity of goods must be imported. If cost were no 
object such a position would be obtainable. Self-sufficiency 
----------------------·-----
and protection stand between the ext11:'emes of complete economic 
isolation and free trade. Protection is nearer the free trade 
extreme and self-sufficiency nearer the self-containment ex-
treme, the difference between all forms being merely one of 
degree. 
As has been suggested the cost of self-sufficiency will 
vary with the degree of isolation desired. All the costs inci-j 
dent to protective tariffs apply here with increased severity. I 
In formulating all tariffs some consideration is given to costs 
of production and consequently costs to the consumer, but with 
a self-containment policy there may be no limit to the protec-
tion given if it is desired to produce the good domestically 
or· to use domestic substitutes. For example, Germany has 
greatly curtailed her imports of cotton and attempted to use 
substitutes. The result has been inferior cloth at a higher 
price. More concretely, 11 in December, 1937 when wheat was 
selling on the Chicago exchange for slightly under a dollar a 
bushel, the higher barriers against imports imposed by a num-
ber of European countries, in the interest of self-sufficiency, 
brought the price of home grown wheat to $1.70 per bushel in 
Paris, $1.98 in Milan, and $2.26 in Berlin. 11 ~· 
It is obvious that a policy of self-sufficiency, or 
autarkie, is more apt to breed poverty than plenty. Nations 
e maintaining some semblance of foreign trade and nations bless-
ed with an abundance and variety of raw materials have been 
~i-rrTrade Barriers and Their Effects on the Consumer 11 The Annals 
of the American Academy, July, 1938 p. 24 
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able, on the whole, to maintain higher standards of living. 
The resulting internal tension in nationalistic countries is 
e apt to b.e diverted into external aggression. The degree to 
which this expansion is carried depends partly on the degree 
to which the country practicing national socialism has primary 
raw materials and natural resources within its borders or with 
in its contral. In a "have-not 11 country, where these essentia 
materials are lacking, imperialism is apt to develop. This ne 
imperialism, unlike the imperialism of the last century, does 
not attempt to colonize undeveloped sections of the world in 
order to export their resources and provide new markets. In-
stead, it strives for economic penetration of sovereign states 
to obtain a greater economic area, a Grossraum.-wirtschaft. 
Such a policy certainly threatens peace and is mutually incom-
patible with a concept of world trade designed to benefit all 
sectionsof the world. This group formation among nations is 
not the only danger of a power economy. Before the World War 
individuals did the trading and governraent regulation, by mean 
of tariffs or otherwise, usually affected only these individu-
als. Now, the intricate trade regulations developed by nation 
alistic countries tend to make the state a trader. ~fuen this 
happens trade programs can be forced on lesser nations. Coer-
cion becomes a dominant factor. "Political power is utilized 
as a weapon in commerciaa relations and economic power is util 
ized as a weapon in political relations; in brief, another net 
of 'international intanglements' is created. 11 ->~ 
~l-USelf-Sufficiency and Imperialism" The ]l_nnals of the American 
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This new imperialism is far more powerful and far more danger-
ous than the imperialism of an earlier date. The anarchy of 
·e international organization that led to the development of self-
sufficiency and a power economy in some of the larger countries 
has made smaller countries follow suit. The statesmen of the 
smaller countires having an inadequate supply of raw materials, 
would greatly benefit from freer trade, but the aggressiveness 
of their neighbors and the ever-present menace of war have made 
them think in terms of preparedness. Thus, not only in Italy, 
Germany, and Japan, but in most countries, the tendency toward 
extr.eme nationalism is gaining ground regardless of the tre-
mendous cost involved. Once action has been taken it is easie 
to keep the movement going. This does not mean that protective 
tariffs, even high protection, leads to nationalism, but that 
insofar as tariffs are easier to raise than to lower; to that 
extent, a't least, excessive tariffs are a dangerous policy. As 
will be seen lat.er, it is one of the aims of our reciprocal 
trade agreement program to combat this policy as a theory at 
home and as a fact in foreign relations. 
Development of Trade Barriers 
The current trade policies of the United States are de-
signed, among other things, to combat the trade barriers and 
discriminatory trade practices of national socialistic coun·:.. · 
tries. Therefore, it might be well to review the mechanics of 
these barriers before studying our method of alleviating the 
---------- -~--·~---·----­
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consequences of hampered trade. Trade restriction is one of 
the tools of a power economy in the initial economic penetra-
tion of a smaller country. Again, certain impoverished nations 
have sought to alleviate their condition by obtaining exclusive 
markets in foreign countries for their exports in exchange for 
preferences granted foreign goods in their own markets. These 
discriminatory preferences are effected by such regulatory de-
vices as bilateral agreements, quota restrictions, clearing an 
compensation agreements and exchange controls. Each preferen-
tial tariff enacted necessitates discrimination against all 
other countries, which will, in turn, invite retaliation and 
further discrimination. This trading in preferences is mutu-
ally · incompatible with equality of treatment and one .·or the 
other must give way.. For example, if one country has given a 
preference to an ally or a superior power; it can obviously no 
longer grant equality to other nations. 
Bilateral balancing and the insurance of the payment of 
exports.has led to the_development of clearing agreements. 
This arrangement between pairs of countries almost o.bliterates 
other foreign competitors and therefore may become a powerful 
weapon in the hands ·of the aggressive nation. The smaller 
countries,,if.parties to these agreements, are apt to become 
economically dependent on the larger country. Then, by means 
of coercion, all trade and economic activity of the weaker na-
tion may be regimented for the greatest benefit of the superior 
power. This tends to create essentially puppet states. 
---- -------
--------- -------
Another supplementary control of trade is the attempt o 
certain governments to control exchange rates. The breakdown 
~ of the gold standard with the consequent embargos on gold ship 
~ents removed the restraining influence on exchange flucuation 
In order to protect their domestic money, governments have at-
tempted various controls. The operation of these controls wil 
be briefly explained in the following paragraphs. 
Exchange depreciation may be accomplished by decreasing 
the weight of the national monetary unit. Such depreciation 
temporarily increases the purchasing power of foreign exchange 
in the domestic market. It tends to subsidize exports and ex-
elude imports. The effect is short-lived, however, for prices 
would re-adjust themselves •. In one sense. it is destructive, 
for foreign countries may retaliate for the protection of thei 
exports, thus causing severe exchange variations and further 
unstable monetary conditions. 
By the purchase of gold in the external market, a natio 
can depress its currency sufficiently to encourage exports. 
Again, this condition is but temporary. The purchasing power 
of foreign agencies transferred to the domestic ma.rke~ by this 
process is taken from their own home market and their prices 
eventually decrease, off-setting the temporary advantage of th 
gold-purchasing country. 
Blocked exchange, however, is probably the most danger-
ous form of exchange control. It is a tool of power economy; 
it definitely restricts trade; and it breeds retaliation and 
much ill-will. Here the governmental body controls the pur-
chase of exchange to prevent it from leaving the country. Thi 
practice makes it difficult for foreign creditors to obtain 
payment for their goods. They may invest their claim in the 
domestic market or accept domestic goods of the debtor country 
in payment. There are the stories of an American corporation 
that was forced to accept something like 100,000 harmonicas in 
payment for goods shipped to Germany and of Rumania, who had t 
accept enough German drugs to last for years in payment for he 
exports. True or not, these examples indicate the extremes to 
which international trade can be demoralized by blocked ex-
change. Again, the debtor country may offer to buy back the 
exchange but at a substancial discount. 
The fear of this 11purchase discounttr and the uncertaint 
of its extent naturally causes a serious drag on foreign trade~ 
Imperialistic nations have usma modified form of blocked ex-
change to obtain a foreign market for their goods. For example 
Germany and Italy built up large debts due Yugoslavia in the 
purchase of necessary raw materials. By refusing payment, the 
countries gradually gained some control over the Yugoslavian 
market. As this condition became apparent it discouraged 
foreign capital and created financial str:Lngenc:Les. 'll- With the . 
setting up of quotas in June, 1936 one control followed another. 
Exporters were forbidden to change prices; gold was purchased; 
and finally, the blocked account system was adopted. All these 
1<-New York Times 12/8/37 
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measures were intended to benefit the debtor nations Italy and 
Germany, in an attempt to obtain payment and reestablish the 
Yugoslavian financial structure .~H*" (Yugoslavia, a product of the 
World War, was largely financed by French capita~) The finan-
cial condition was eased somewhat, but the abuse and curtail-
ment of British, American, and French trade has tended to raise 
the cost of living. The barriers are nearly complete. Germany 
and Italy dominate the foreign market and exert enough politi-
cal and economic power to obtain the goods they want at the 
prices they are willing to pay. ·This, very briefly, demon-
strates some of the dangers of trade barriers and imperialism 
arising out of attempted self-sufficiency. It represents the 
change that is taking place in many small countries, although 
it is not always as obvious or as complete as in the case of 
Yugoslavia. 
Economic and Political Need for. Tariff Revisions 
From the foregoing analysis of world conditions it is 
obvious that something must be done to stop this trend toward 
extreme nationalism, if peace is to be maintained. To the ex-
t"ent that lower tariffs tend to remove trade controls, such 
tariff revisions may be considered instruments of peace. This 
is so since these trade controls are the chief tools of power 
economies used both in obtaining and maintaining control over 
weaker nations. 
~E-New York Times 12/15/37 
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From a selfish;more businesslike point of view tariff 
revision is necessary. 11 In a word_, national wealth under mor-
~ dern conditions depends on foreign trade. Existing national 
standards of living cannot be maintained without international 
trade; and international trade cannot be maintained if existing 
trade barriers are to be continually heightened and present dis-
criminatory practices are to continue to spread their poison 
throughout the economic system of the world. 11 il- in our own 
country, as was shown, our 1930 tariff act introduced some very 
.high rates. It is impossible to measure accurately the change 
in average rates from year to year. Changes in demand for 
heavily taxed goods and goods on the free list may take place 
in part as a result of changes in the duty, but, in any case, 
such differences would greatly affect an average rate of duty. 
These relative changes in quantities and prices have caused sig-
nificant changes in average equivalent rates even in years when 
there has been no change in duties. However, the trend of the 
average ad valorem rate for the last twenty years will give 
some indication of the trend of our tariff policy. (See appen-
dix schedule #1~) 
It can be seen here that our tariff rates have been ris-
ing steadily since 1922. This has been one of the chief causes 
for the decrease in our exports in recent years. The schedule 
previously referred toi~~will give some indication of the rela-
~!-Proceedings. of the Academy of Political Science Vol.XVII 
May, 1937 p. 94 
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tive change in the per cent of our exports to the total produc-
tion of exportable commodities. There can be little enduring 
peace without general and lasting prosperity. People who are 
continually in want, who, in power economies must sacrifice 
llbutter for cannontt are a continual threat to peace. 
Our loss of exports has affected our internal economy 
somewhat, but the almost complete lack of trade among other for-
eign countries must seriously reduce the standards of living of 
those peoples. Our present trade agreement program was design-
ed to combat these two related evils--the loss of foreign trade 
with its consequent effect on human welfare and the threat of 
conflict made more real by the extreme nationalistic tendencies 
of many nations. It is hoped that the reciprocal trade agree-
ments may, by lessening the barriers to international trade, 
accomplish these above aims. 
===1:1-== ______ ::::: === 
--
Chapter 4 
Aims Of Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
The economic factors giving rise to a feeling for a 
revision of our tariff policy have been chronologically de-
veloped in the last chapter. The specific outcome of this 
movement, that is, origin; aims and development of trade 
pacts is the subject of this chapter. Perhaps the clearest 
way to introduce the subject is to quote in full the Presi-
dent's message to Congress on the subject. This letter brief-
ly describes the state of international trade together with 
the demand for immediate aid for our export industries and 
the purpose of the necessary legislation. The letter follows. 
To the Congress: 
I am requesting the Congress to authorize the Execu-
tive to enter into executive commercial agreements with for-
eign nations; and in pursuance thereof within carefully guard-
ed limits to modify existing duties and import restrictions 
in such a way as will benefit American agriculture and indus-
try. · 
This action seems opportune and necessary at this time 
for several reasons. 
First; world trade has declined with startling rapidi-
ty. Measured in terms of the volume of goods in 1933, it has 
been reduced to approximately 70 percent of its 1929 volume; 
measured in terms of dollars, it has fallen to 35 percent. 
The drop in the foreign trade of the United States has been 
even sharper. Our exports in 1933 were but 52 percent of the 
1929 volume, and 32 percent of the 1929 value. 
This has meant idle hands, still machines, ships tied 
to their docks, despairing farm households, and hungry indus-
--
trial families. It has made infinitely more difficult the 
planning for economic readjustment in which the Government is 
now engaged. 
You and I know that the world does not stand still; 
that trade movements and relations once interrupted can with 
the utmost difficulty be restored; that even in tranquil and 
prosperous times there is a constant shifting of trade chan-
nels.-
How much greater, how much more violent is the shifting 
in these times of change and of stress is clear from the re-
cord of current history. Every nation must at all times be in 
a position quickly to adjust its taxes and tariffs to meet 
sudden changes and avoid severe fluctuations in both its ex-
ports and its imports. 
You and I know, too, that it is important that the coun-
try possess within its borders a necessary diversity and bal-
ance to maintain a rounded national life, that it must sustain 
activities vital to national defense and that such interests 
cannot be sacrificed for passing advantage. Equally clear is 
the fact that a full and permanent domestic recovery depends 
in part upon a revived and strengthened international trade 
and that American exports cannot be permanently increased 
without a corresponding increase in imports. 
Second, other governments are to an ever-increasing ex-
tent winning their share of international trade by negotiated 
reciprocal trade agreements. If American agricultural and 
industrial interests are to retain their deserved place in 
this trade, the .American Government must be in a position to 
bargain for that place with other governments by rapid and 
decisive negotiation based upon a carefully considered pro-
gram, and to grant with discernment corresponding opportuni-
ties in the American market for foreign products supplementary 
to our own. 
If the American Government is not in a position to make 
fair offers for fair opportunities, its trade will be super-
seded. If it is not in a position at a given moment rapidly 
to alter the terms on which it is willing to deal with other 
countries, it cannot adequately protect its trade against dis-
criminations and against bargains injurious to its interests. 
Furthermore, a promise to which prompt effect cannot be given 
is not an inducement which can pass current at par in commer-
cial negotiations. 
For this reason any smaller degree of authority in the 
hands of the Executive would be ineffective. The executive 
branches of virtually all other important trading countries 
already possess some such power. 
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I would emphasize that quick results are not to be ex-
pected. The successful building up of trade without injury 
to American producers depends upon a cautious and gradual evo-
lution of plans. 
The disposition of other countries to grant an improved 
place to American products should be carefully sounded and 
considered; upon the attitude of each must somewhat depend our 
future course of action. With countries which are unwilling 
to abandon purely restrictive national programs, or to make 
concessions toward the reestablishment of international trade, 
no headway will be possible. 
The exercise of the authority which I propose must be 
carefully weighed in the light of the latest information so as 
to give assurance that no sound and important American inter-
est will be injuriously disturbed. The adjustment of our for-
eign-trade relations must rest on the premise of undertaking 
to benefit and not to injure such interest. In a time of dif-
ficulty and unemployment such as this, the highest considera-
tion of the position of the different branches of American 
production is required. 
From the policy of reciprocal negotiation which is in 
prospect, I hope in time that definite gains will result to 
American agriculture and industry. 
Important branches of our agriculture, such as cotton, 
tobacco, hog products, rice, cereal, and fruit raising, and 
those branches of American industry whose mass production meth-
ods have led the world, will find expanded opportunities and 
productive capacity in foreign markets, and will thereby be 
spared in part, at least, the heartbreaking readjustments that 
must be necessary if the shrinking of American foreign com-
merce remains permanent. 
A resumption of international trade cannot but improve 
the general situation of other countries, and thus increase 
their purchasing power. Let us well remember that this in turn 
spells increase~ opportunity for American sales. 
Legislation such as this is an essential step in the 
program of national economic recovery which the Congress has 
elaborated during the past year. It is part of an emergency 
program necessitated by the economic crisis through which we 
are passing. It should provide that the trade agreements shall 
be terminable within a period not to exceed 3 years; a shorter 
period probably would not suffice for putting the program into 
effect. In its execution the Executive must, of course, pay 
due heed to the requirements of other branches of our recovery 
program, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act. 
I hope for early action. The many immediate situations 
in the field of international trade that today await our atten-
tion can thus be met effectively and with the least possible 
delay. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 
The White House, March 2, 1934 
In response to the President's request for immediate ac-
tion, a bill was introduced on the day the message was deliver-
ed. The bill was passed by Congress and became Public Law #316 
on June 12, 1934. 
Secretary of State Hull, in stating the objectives of thE 
program, reiterated the President's sentiment but he laid more 
stress on the peace-insuring aspects of the plan. He emphasize( 
the necessity of "The preservation of peace in the achievement 
of prosperity throughout the world, by giving trade among na-
tions a chance to thrive, through the mutual abando~rnent of 
world trade barriers. 11 ?~ It is difficult to state to what ex-
tent, if any, this second objective was an attempt to forestall 
criticism. Vfuether or not it is a prime objective, it immedi-
ately places critics at a disadvantage. 
Mechanics and Procedure 
The trade agreement act gave the President the power to 
negotiate reciprocal trade agreements by modifying existing cus-
toms duties and other import restrictions in exchange for simi-
lar concessions from reciprocating countries. As was asked in 
the President's message this power was to extend for three 
years, However, in 193? the program was extended for another 
*New York TimeR OP.tnhA-r 1 o J 9:'S7 
three years. 
The President is expected to seek advice from the United 
e States Tariff Commission and the departments of State, Agricul-
ture, and Commerce. In practice most of the work is done by 
seventy-odd members of the trade agreement section of the De-
partment of State. Public notice is given to all interested 
persons so that they may express their views and present their 
problems at the hearings preceding the adoption of each pact. 
The purpose of these hearings is to make sure that, in so far 
as possible, reductions are granted where a foreign comparative 
advantage exists, and on complimentary rather than competing 
goods. The hearings are also designed to prevent discrimina-
tion against any particular section of the country by not all0w 
ing reductions on all the important manufactures of a particu-
lar locality. For example the agreements with Great Britain 
and Czechoslovakia permitted lower rates on textiles and shoes 
respectively. Since these are the two largest industries of 
New England, the concessions were partially restricted to sup-
plementary and only indirectly competing goods. Although the 
shoes from Czechoslovakia compete with New England manufactures 
-the.. 
it was expected that they would compete with only~cheapest grad 
of shoes and be supplementary to the balance of New England's 
shoe production. Again, imported British textiles compete very 
little with domestic cloth since they are largely "specialties" 
of a higher price range. 
There is no limitation on the life of the agreements, 
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show unequivocably the value of trade agreements~ we can turn 
to such data as are available. 
Relative Change in Imports 
Imports decreased in 1938 over 1937, the decrease being 
somewhat less for agreement than for non-agreement countries. 
This decrease amounted to 28.9% for the agreement group as a-
gainst 41.6% for the other group. Referring to the above para-
graph, one cause for this relative change was a factor affect-
ing only non-agreement countries. The depression of 1938 ne-
cessitated serious curtailment of basic raw material purchases. 
Since many of these raw materials, such as rubber, tin, wool, 
hides and skins were obtainable chiefly in non-agreement coun-
tries; trade with these countries suffered most during 1938. 
In comparing the two-year period 1937-38 with the pre-
agreement period 1934-35, imports from agreement countries in-
creased 35.2%, while imports from non-agreement countries in-
creased 37%. Normally one would expect imports from agreement 
countries to increase more rapidly than for non-agreement coun-
tries, but inventory buying of raw materials, as shown above, 
partly accounts for the difference. 
Relative Change in Exports 
As was the case with imports, exports to both groups de-
clined in 1938 over 1937 although the decrease was slightly 
less for agreement countries over non-agreement countries. In 
comparing the last two years with the pre-agreement years of 
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1934-35 the increase of exports to,agreement countries was much 
larger than to the other group. The figures for 1938 show a 
e decline over 1937 of 6.8% for agreement countries as against 
8.1% for non-agreement countries. The broader two-year compari 
son shows an increase of 61.2% for agreement countries and only 
37.9% increase for non-agr~ement countries. 
Although our exports decreased in 1938 over 1937 for 
reasons already cited, it is interesting to note that the de-
cline was much smaller than those suffered by most other coun-
tries. As was pointed out this was due largely to the re-arma-
ment programs of foreign countries. One other comment, our ex-
ports to non-agreement coLmtries were maintained largely by 
shipments to Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Great Britain, alone, absorbed one-third of our ex-
ports to non-agreement coLmtries. The agreement with this coun 
try will make such comparisons in the future incomparable. 
Russia helped to maintain our exports to non-agreement countrie 
by large purchases in machinery. 
Summary of Changes 
In the trade with agreement countries during the last 
two years, exports increased more than imports as compared to 
the pre-agreement years of 1934-35. The increase in exports 
~, averaged $465,000,000 annually compared to an average annual 
increase in imports of only $280,000,000. Omitting the agree-
ment with Czechoslovakia, there are now 18 agreements in opera-
tion which acco1.mt for almost 60% of the total foreign trade of 
the United states. From the single viewpoint of administratio~ 
4lt then, it would seem that the program is a success. But even 
though well executed, there is no positive proof that the goals 
of the program have been accomplished. ··The most that can be 
said is that the avaiiable information is prima-facie evidence 
of the success of the plan. 
Weaknesses and Possible Dangers 
'The aims and methods of Secretary Hull's trade agreement 
program have certain fundamental weaknesses. As has been shown 
above, the agreements have met with some degree of success; how-
ever, greater and more permanent success might be acquired by 
other methods. In analysing the operations of this trade agree-
ment plan, we can divide the problems into two classes; first, 
those inherent in any plan to restore foreign trade; and second 
the specific objections to this particular method of dealing 
with foreign trade problems. 
In all probability the tendency to an increase in world 
trade with a program for peace has been somewhat over-empha-
sized. Although there is a great deal of truth in the argument 
especially where trade is forced or restricted by power econo-
mies; it must be remembered that the opposite argument once 
4lt prevailed. That is, the English~Canadian, and German trade ri-
valries were one cause of the World ·war. The truth is that a 
mere increase or~~crease in foreign trade will not in itself 
insure world peace. Insofar, however, as an increase in world 
trade is able to break down the barriers of nationalism and 
4lt destroy the tools of power-economies, it tendsrto insure peace. 
1Iere, however, is a real difficulty. The increased standards 
of living, security, and peace to be gained through increased 
trade do not or cannot appeal to all nations. Where power-
economy holds sway these inducements ar'e of little avail for 
they'may endanger the military power of a nation and they do 
not aid in conquest of raw materials and resources. Then again 
smaller nations, if at all threatened, have no choice, but must 
turn their interests toward power-economy. Unless the irunedi-
ate threat of war is removed, they cannot be expected to whole-
heartedly accept our trade program. 
Any program inten~ed to increase foreign.trade is, to a 
certain extent, opposed to our New Deal program. As was pointe 
out in the general discussion on protection, there comes a time 
when a choice must be made between an increased standard of 
ing and protection. The United States has, of course, not 
reached that stage, but the artificial increases in standards 
of living proposed by certain New Deal acts cannot be maintaine 
without protection. Increases in our welfare standard must be 
gradual with occasional set-backs due to serious depressions. 
Artificial increases in times of depression are diametrically 
opposed to lower tariffs. For example, the curtailment in pro-
duction of agricultural products has increased their cost so 
that it is difficult to sell them abroad. 
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As a corfollary to the above problem, these are other in-
dications that the trade pacts do not sufficiently increase our 
4lt foreign trade. The increase in our imports provided foreigners 
with dollar credits here and a definite increase in foreign pur-
'\ 
chasing power. However, there is no assurance that this for-
eign purchasing power will be used to purchase American agri-
cultural and manufactured products. This tremendous credit 
could be, and has been, used to purchase foreign bonds and to 
invest in the securities of domestic,corporations. An indica-
-t;J,-,"' 
tion of the extent to which~condition prevailed is given by the 
extent of American investments in Czechoslovakia at the time of 
its being afforded 11protection 11 by Germany. The State Depart-
ment claims that this potential loss to American investors will 
be relatively small since the Czecks have bought back about 70% 
of their bonded indebtedness. The dollar bonds outstanding by 
the Czech government totaled only $17,448,300 and the city of 
Prague bonds $5,401,000 making a tatal of only $22,849,000. Al-
though there is, of course, no proof, the re-purchase of these 
bonds may well have been accomplished by the dollar cre~its of 
our imports under the reciprocal trade agreement.i~ 
The Great Depression and the lesser relapse in 1937, 
,coupled with lower prices occajsioned by our depreciated curren-
cy, increased the opportunities for increased investments in 
our security market. 
Then, again, these dollar credits can also be used to 
~*-Boston Herald, March 5, 1939 
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purchase goods in other markets; foreigners ar.e not limited to 
our domestic market. There is no guarantee that our agricul-
tural and industrial products will be exports relative to the 
increase in foreign purchasing power due to increased imports. 
As has been shown, foreigners are at liberty to buy where and 
what they please and if they do buy American products i't will 
be to suit their particular needs and not ~~ the needs of Ameri 
can industry and agriculture. This condition is due in part to 
the high costs in some of our export industries occapsioned by 
the- New Deal program, but it is aggravated by the instability 
of international money and price systems, that is, temporary 
advantages in one market over another because of unsettled con-
ditions. 
It should be noted that these problems are largely of a 
temporary nature and that in the long run our foreign trade can 
be restored by a well-designed program. The trade agreement 
program, with perhaps certain modifications, may eventually be 
successful in restoring trade, but it must be remembered that 
this plan was designed from a long-run point of view and is not 
necessarily adaptable to the changing short-run conditions des-
cribed above. 
The chief specific objection to the present reciprocal 
agreement plan deals with its administrative body. The Trade 
41' Agreements Section of the Department of State comprises some 
seventy men, mostly Democrats, who are not even under civil ser 
vice. There is no assurance that these men are non-partisan or 
•· ~-~-----~ --~~---- -·~--- --- -------::.=.==---:·---- -· .. -
even bi-partisan, and it is probable that they have some pre-
conce.ived idea of what is wanted. Although they may now be 
working wholly free from outside influences and pressure groups 
there is nothing inherent in their organization which could pre-
vent it from degenerating into a rubber stamp for special inter I 
ests. There is no guarantee that it can continually remain 
aloof from the lobbying that continually besets Congress when a 
new tariff is formulated. 
A more fundamental question deals with the legality of 
the entire plan. "It is difficult to interpret indefinite con-
stitutional provisions (such as 'general welfare' clauses, etc. 
under which the President might assume authority to restrict or 
prohibit imports or exports whether by tariffs or by other 
means. 11 1} However, tariff bills are revenue bills and should 
originate in the House, and it may be that Congress had no right 
to invest the President with the power to execute these trade 
pacts. It tends t.o -u_pset the balance of power in the Federal 
Governmen~placing to much power with the Chief Executive. It 
is a step toward bureaucracy and away from Democracy. The mere 
fact that Congress is not. given a chance. to vote on the agree-
ment~ questions at once either the validity of ~he agreement or 
the intelligence and honesty of the representatives of·the peo-
ple. It is not that the ideasof the agreements are not commend-
abae, but that their preparation and execution is not done in a 
democratic manner. In spite of all the pulling and hauling in 
?}The Tariff and Its History p. 62 
Congress, if the proposed agreement is not presented to them 
f·or acceptance, we are in fact saying that the representatives 
~ of the people must be wrong if they do not agree with a small 
group of individuals appointed by the President and largely mem-
bers of his political party. Regardless of the soundness of 
the agreements and the eventual gain, the organization and ad-
ministration of these agreements call for something other than 
the pure democratic idea on which this nation was built. There 
is no eminent danger, to be sure, but the seed has been sown foJ 
possible danger in the future. 
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Chapter 5 
The Czechoslovakian .Agreement 
Now that we have established the imperative need for 
tariff revision and have show.n how reciprocal trade agreements 
were intended to solve the problem, we can turn our attention 
to the aims and effects of specific agreements. At the time 
this agreement was first contemplated Czechoslovakia was the 
last surviving democracy in Central Europe, and was in immedi-
ate danger of becoming a German province. It was the hope of 
Secretary Hull that this trade agreement would help save this 
democracy from falling into Hitlerrs hands. It was not expect-
ed, of course, that Czechoslovakia would be as easy a prey as 
was Austria. For, although the republicrs history dates only 
from the World War Armistice, it has its own Czech language and 
15,000,000 citizens of whom only 3,000,000 are German. Then, 
again, Czechoslovakia had substantial mutual assistance pacts 
with France and _Russia; she might prove a valuable ally to us 
in the event of a war. In any event, it was important to world 
peace that this strategic territory between Germany and Italy 
remain a progressive, prosperous democracy. 
In order to obtain a more clear understanding of the 
~ scope and effect of this trade pact it will be necessary to 
describe the terms of the agreement. The concessions granted 
to Czechoslovakia can be readily seen by comparing the new and 
.e 
old ad valorem or eQuivalent rates on schedule #~!of the appen-
dix. The value of the imports under these various classifica-
tions for 1937 are the latest available figures, those for 1938 
will not be published until 1940. In summary, tariff reduc-
tions were granted on 63 items, on 54 items the duties were re-
duced, and on the remaining 9 items the duties were bound at 
the present rate. The full 50% reduction was allowed dn 4% of 
our total imports from Czechoslovakia. In return the United 
States was allowed to ship phosphates, rosin, wood, sulphur, 
animal hair, borax and turpentine on a new free list. Prague 
also reciprocated by maintaining cotton and copper, our two 
largest exports to that country, on their free list. While our 
exports to Czechoslovakia have fallen off from about $32,000,aD 
in 1929 to about $19,000,000 in 1936 (due largely to tariff 
QUotas and other trade restrictions) that country is still a 
substantial purchaser of our cotton, copper, tobacco, petrole-
um, fruits, machinery and other products. The following fig-
ures will give some indication of the extent and type of pur-
chases made by Czechoslovakia from this country.* 
Year Cotton Machinery Other Goods Total 
1930 5,185,689 1,130,600 999,178 7,315,467 
1931 9,780,325 990,890 5,522,844 16,294,059 
1932 12,588,343 1,230,360 2,069,505 15,888,208 
1933 31,065,362 1,097,248 1,766,457 33,929,067 
1934 20,758,801 2,070,600 2,017,484 24,846,885 
1935 3,860,150 1,573,190 4,167,798 9,600,838 
1936 4,'735,643 2,953,115 '7 ,414 ,415 15,103,173 
*Facts vs. Fury p. 34 
Since the chief controversy at the time was over shoe 
imports, the following information is somewhat more specific. 
The importation of shoes had been free from tariffs .under the 
tariff act of 1922. The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 placed an ad 
valorem duty of 20% on almost all shoes. Section 1530E of this 
mented shoes on which the existing duty bas not been altered. 
If imports exceed these quotas, the excess goods would be sub-
ject to increased tariff rates to be determined by representa-
tives from each country.** 
These figures cannot show the whole picture because 
there is a great divergence in the types of shoes imported. 
For example, the second largest type of footwear now being im-
ported are molded shoes where the sole is laced to the upper. 
These shoes are produced solely by Czechoslovakia. They are 
manufactured nowhere in the United States and do not enter into 
direct competition with any comparable domestic footwear. Thes 
shoes constitute more than l/10 of our Czechoslovakian imports 
*nchanges in Import Duty Since the Passage of the Tariff Act 
of 1930" 
**New York Times March 13, 1938--Boston Herald March 11, 1938 
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and are subject to the 20% duty. The inclusion of these shoes 
(amounting to over 300,000 pairs in 1937*) in any analysis of 
shoe imports will materially distort of misrepresent the effect 
that foreign-made shoes have on our domestic industry. 
More important than the inclusi-on of molded sole shoes 
is the inclusion of the controversial cemented shoes. Cement 
constructed shoes are those in which the sole is cemented to 
the upper. Until the development of pyroxylin cements in 1931 
pr~ctically no cemented shoes were made eith~r in this country 
of in Europe. It so happened that abo11.t this same time (Janu-
ary 1, 1932) the tariff on McKay shoes was raised to 30% while 
the dp.ty on cemented soles under the heading nother footwearn 
was left at 20%. It has been contended that, as Bata was put 
to a disadvantage by this increased tariff, he turned his at-
tention to the manufacture of cemented shoes, an inferior pro-
duct with which he flooded the American market.** 
While the shift in production from McKay to cement con-
structed shoes may have been influenced the 1932 tariff change, 
the greater importation .(as well as domestic production) is 
mereJ,.y the result of a natural shift in consumer demand. The 
following figures*** will show that it was the United States 
that ~irst developed mass production o~ these cheap shoes. Im-
ported Czechoslovakian cemented ahoes amount to less than 4% 
of our production of cemented shoes and less than i of 1% of 
*nFacts vs. Furyn p. 29 
**M-r. J. 0. Ball -New York Herald Tribune 11/1/37 
***U.s. Tariff Commission Memorandum June 26, 1936 
• 
our total production. In short, Czechoslovakia has merely fol-
lowed in our footsteps and is in no position to flood our mar-
kets with cheap shoes. 
UNITED STATES PRODUCTION 
All Cemented Shoes McKay Sewed Shoes 
. 
1931 9,700,000 96,000,000 
1933 36,000,000 83,000,000 
1935 50,000,000 77.,000,000 
The biennial figures for 1937 show an even greater in-
crease in the production of cemented shoes; of these over 96% 
are women's shoes. 
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PRODUCTION 
All Cemented Shoes 
1935 1,211 
1936 653,192 
1937 2,261,784 
(10 months) 
McKay Sewed Shoes 
1,15~,282 
541,691 
16,698 
Production of Czechoslovakian cemented shoes before 
1935 was negligible. 
The Bata Shoe Company 
Since 90% of all Czechoslovakian shoes imported into 
this country are the product of one concern, Bata A. S., a des-
cription of this concern will accurately represent the industry 
of that country as a whole. This survey is necessary for a 
subsequent discussion of wages, prices and standards of' living. 
The Bata family has been making shoes at Zlin for over 
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300 years, but it was not until 1923 that the Bata system as 
we know it today came into existence. 
I' 
During 1923 Bata reqganized his entire factory-. It was 
at this time that he instigated his famous system of autonomous 
work shops and independently managed selling agencies. The 
Bata organization now includes six large factory buildings 
housing thirty-six separate shoe m~nufacturing units. The Bata 
Company also operates a railroad, hotels; restaurants, separate 
homes for male and female operatives, and a well-equipped mod-
ern hospital. Nor is that all, the company has expanded so far 
in the vertical trust form of organization that it owns or con-
trols its own tanneries, machine shop, saw, paper and hosiery 
mills, brick kilns, a printing plant, chemical laboratories and 
a rubber factory.* 
In spite of the enormous size of this organization, 
Bata has been able to maintain the highest efficiency by means 
of standardized production routines, automatic conveyors and 
other mass production methods. However, in the shoe industry 
where the element of labor is normally very important, mass 
production methods are hard to co-ordinate and maintain. Ford 
partly overcame this problem in the automobile industry by 
' piece-rates and high wages. Bata has gone a good deal further 
and has ingeniously shifted the responsibility for the mainte-
e nance of efficiency and production schedules on the shoulders 
of his employees. Each of the thirty-six factories is divided 
into two hundred and fifty separate shops. Each shop keeps its 
*Brief of N. E. Shoe and Leather Assoc. p. 12 
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own set of books, controls its own costs and is expected to 
show a profit from its own operations. In short, each shop is 
a separate business controlled by the employees of that shop. 
The purchasing agent of each 9hop will normally buy his raw mat 
erials from the shop just before him in the sequence of opera-
tions, but if the goods are not up to standard or if the price 
is considered too high he may purchase from outside producers. 
It becomes necessary, then, for each shop to produce high quali 
ty goods and at the same time to keep its costs below those of 
outside competitors. 
The co-operative interest of the employees in the pro-
gress of their particular shop is maintained by allowing them 
to share in the profits of their shop. All the work-shops have 
a uniform lay-out which makes it easier to plan production 
j schedules and to compare costs; but it also promotes rivalry 
between the various shops. This system of workshop autonomy 
has even been applied to the social departments. The press pro 
ducing the shop magazine (Sdeleni) is autonomous, so are the 
hospital, the cinema and the restaurant. All these practices 
shift the burden of controlling costs on the employee, leaving 
the executive staff free to co-ordinate all the "independentrr 
producers. In the subsequent discussion it will become clear 
exactly how the employee is made to bear his share of responsi-
bility. 
Although we have shown that the lower Bata's costs are 
(including wages,) the more advantageous it is for us to deal 
with them; there is not the divergence between Czechoslovakian 
and American wages as would appear on the surface. It is very 
difficult indeed to compare wage levels in the shoe industry in 
these two countrie~; therefore any conclusions that may be 
drawn are merely approximations and must not be construed to 
represent actual differences. 
The large number of variables involved in determining 
the remuneration of Bata employees makes it difficult to give 
any exact idea of the prevailing level of wages. These com-
plexities arise because af the profit-sharing system, the con-
tingency of loss, the uncertainty of the number of hours of 
work, and the fact that Bata provides most of the necessities 
of life for his employees at a mere nominal cost. 
The regular factory hours are from 7:00 A. M. to noon 
and from 2:00 P. M. until 5:00 P. M. Since the employees at 
Zlin work only five days a week, their 40 hour week is compara-
ble to our own. The weekly wages for the four different wage 
groups are as follows: 
Men over 21 years of age ( 45foaf personnel) 480 crowns 
Women 11 II tl TT I! (16% II rt 240 n 
Youths under 21 years of age (26% of personnel) 210 " 
Girls II IT tt IT T1 ( 13%. II n 150 fT 
A weighted average of these wage levels would show an 
average wage of approximately 330 crowns per week. This aver-
age appears low because of the large percentage (40%) of young 
men and women employed. The Koruna has a mint par value of 
4 18/100 cents but its present exchange value is approximately 
3 1/2 cents~ (April 1, 1938) Assuming the standard week of 40 
hours and the current exchange rate, the weighted average nor-
mal hourly rate would be 28.9 cents an·.hour. * 
The work unit of each employee is so arranged that he 
has ?-1/2 hours work to do per day. The extra 1/2 hour is al-
lowed each workman to cover th~ minutes lost in starting and 
adjusting his machine. It appears that, unless the workman is 
extremely efficient, the half-hour leeway is not enough time 
to compensate all the delay normally encountered in a dayrs 
work. In or~er to meet their production schedules, therefore, 
many employees are obliged to work overtime. Since there is 
no way of determining the average amount of overtime per em-
ployee, it is impossible to adjust the hourly wage downward. 
Some 50% of Batats employees are paid on a collective 
plan. That is, the wages of any particular individual are de-
pendent on the output of his particular shop. This .method of 
payment cr·eates a feeling of personal interest among the em-
ployees for their particular shop and helps to keep production 
of each shop at a maximum peak. 
Akin to the above plan of wage payment is the contro-
versial participation of employees in the profits and possibly 
the losses of the firm. About 30% of the personnel at Zlin 
participates in the profit-sharing system. If a profit is made 
one half is immediately distributed to the participating em-
*The N. B. & S. Mfg. Assoc.--The Bata Systemy. 13 
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ployees; the remaining portion is held in fund as insurance 
against possible loss. The employees are credited with 10% in-
terest on these compulsory savings. After all possibility of 
inferior or returned goods has passed and if no new loss occurs 
the employees are entitled to draw the remaining share of their 
profits. This proflit-sharing system, incidently, provides a 
very effective check against imperfect workmansbip. The first 
check instigated by this system occurs as the product travels 
from one shop to another. As the shoes proceed along the belt 
each worker carefully examines them for any flaw whatever. If 
fl.aws are found, the shoes are immediately sent back so that 
that particular shop will not have to stand the cost of the 
spoilage. Each factory manager employs inspectors whose sole 
duty is to catch seconds as soon as possible in the course of 
production. These throwouts are charged back to the shop that 
last handled the shoes. If the shoe was well along in the 
course of production, such charge-backs will soon exhaust the 
profit reserve of any shop. Although the operation of this 
profit-sharing system is very intrica~e, the net result is a 
substantial increase in the wages of participating employees. 
Even the opponents of the Bata system admit that, although 
there is considerable uncertainty both as to the exact amount 
of profit actually distributed and as to the time when it is 
made available; it has so far resulted in a real increase in 
the regular wages~ 
The remaining variable to be considered in determining 
. __ 8_9_ 
Bata's wages is the indirect income to the employees resulting 
from Bata's social departments. These intangible benefits in-
elude insurance against accident, sickness, and old age. The 
employees can obtain substantial meals at company owned restau-
rants for 5 or 10 cents. They are given 3 weeks vacation with 
pay which alone would amount to 3/52 or almost a 6% increase 
in weekly pays. There are almost 4,000 dwellings of 3 to 6 
rooms each equipped with water, gas and electricity, which may 
be rented for from 55¢ to $1.50 per week. In addition to this 
there is a well equipped hospital providing surgical, dental 
and orthopedic treatment; schools, libraries, and recreation 
centers are maintained at the expense of the company. Bata 
estimates that these services ·add 20% to the cash wages paid.* 
Even after making liberal allowance for the generally lower 
cost of room and board in Czechoslovakia, the extremely low 
cost charged by the company for these items plus the paid vaca-
tions would in themselves mean almost a 20% increase in real 
income. 
From the above discussion it is apparent that, while no 
accurate estimate of real wages can be made, the real income of 
the employees is substantially greater than the mon.ey incomes 
I listed above. The average·weighted hourly wage of 28.9¢ (above 
was based on figures supplied by the National Boot and Shoe 
4lt Manufacturers Association, the chief opponent of the trade a-
greement. If to this wage is added 20% for intangible benefits 
*Fact vs. Fury p. 10 
and nothing for the profit sharing, the hourly wage is in-
creased to about 35¢ an hour. This estimate of real income is 
not accurate, but it is most certainly on the conservative side. 
Wages in the United States are generally speaking at a 
higher level than in foreign countr·ies. This is so because our 
great exporting industries, both of raw materials and manufac-
tured goods, tend to set the wage level for all industry within 
the country. Even though our shoe industry has not enough com-
parative advantage to make it a great exporting business, it 
must, nevertheless, conform roughly in its wage level to our 
exporting industries if it is to secure an adequate labor sup-
ply. This theory is really a long run rule.and cannot be ap-
pJ:i;ed as of any particular time. As will be shown later, there 
are certain important factors at work which are t.emporarily de-
pressing wage levels in the shoe industry. 
However, for our present comparison, we can overlook 
these factors and compare Bat a's wages with the now inoperative 
N. R. A. code levels. This code established minimum wages va-
rying from 30¢ per hour to 35¢ per hour depending ppon whether 
the industry was located in an urban or rural district. The 
average United States wage hovers around 50¢ per hour,* but 
this is not the proper figure for comparison purposes. The 
N. R. A. code minimum (although it is far from being the mini-
mum) is the more logical comparison figure for the following 
reasons. The 50¢ average includes the wages of highly skilled 
*Leather Fortnightly ~/15/37 p. 4 
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artisans needed in making high grade shoes. The great majority 
of Batats employees are young, unskilled men and women perform-
ing very mechanical operations who would receive in this coun-
try approximately our minimum wage. Even though we overlook 
the fact that Bata has been operating at a greater per cent of 
capacity than American producers, it is apparent that there is 
but little difference between Batats average wage and our theo-
retical minimum. This comparison has been made on an hourly 
basis, for it is impossible to determine exactly at what per 
cent of capacity Bata A. S. is operating. 
A great deal of criticism of this trade pact centered 
around this difference in wage levels. Yet, upon proper analy-
sis, there appears to be no material difference in the real in-
comes of Czechoslovakian and American producers. In fact, if 
we were to take individual cases, it could be shown that the 
wages paid by many American producers are much lower than those 
paid at Zlin. For example, there are many small producers in 
New England engaging in cut-throat competition with each other 
who pay substantially less than a living wage. A recent Sears, 
Roebuck catalogue lists '76 different kinds of woments shoes re-
tailing at $2.00 per pair or less. At the Washington hearing 
on this trade agreement it was shown that none of these Sears, 
Roebuck shoes were Bata-made, but that most of them were made 
by small fly-by-night producers in small New Englan·d towns. At 
the same hearing evidence was submitted to show that a Haver-
hill manufacturer was producing shoes. to retail at $1.30. 
9.2. 
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ican producers manufacture far below Bata's mass production : 
costs. In none of these cases could the laborer.s receive any-
thing resembling the wages paid by Bata. Since differences in 
wage levels was the chief complaint against.the trade pact, and 
in view of the actual wage conditions, the wage-level contra-
versy must have been merely well-organized propaganda. The 
source and extent of this propaganda,is, logically, the next 
subject to be investigated. 
Unusual Resistance to the Particular .Agreement 
We have shown that from the long run viewpoint the 
agreement is to our benefit. We have just as conclusively 
shown that even from the viewpoint of the layman Czechoslovaki~ 
shoe manufacturers are fair competitors. It remains simply to 
show why there was such unusual resistance to this particular 
agreement. 
With the exception of the agreement with Canada, the 
Czechoslovakian agreement is the first reciprocal trade pact 
with a fairly large country. .Again, excepting Canada,. this is 
the first agreement that has endangered a well-organized in-
dustry. Of all the products from Czechoslovakia on which we 
are granting concessions, shoes are the only goods represented 
by an important manufacturers' association. It is to .be expect 
ed then, that here is the place where the voice of special in-
terest will be the loudest. 
The New England and the National Associations have pub-
======#===-=-==-=--=-==---------__ :_:c:=:.::.-=.=:_ --================: 
lished information that, to say the least, is misleading. Pre-
ceding the hearing by the committee for Reciprocity Informa-
tion, the National Boot and Shoe Manufacturers Associations 
sent form letters to interested shoe manufacturers. The fol-
lowing exerpts from thes~ letters will show quite conclusively 
why Secretary Hull found it necessary to publicly rebuke these 
shoe associations. 
nwe are increasing our efforts, and have divided our 
mailing list intb ten divisions, alphabetically arranged ac..:.. 
cording to firm names; and we are enclosing data outlining one 
of the ten major points in our analysis to each of these alpha-
betical classification, in order that shoe manufacturers may 
have some further data to supplement their own views, when 
writing to the Committee for Reciprocity Information ..... 
In addition to reiterating your pbsition taken in pre-
vious letters to the Committee and to your Senators and Con-
gressmen, you may also wish to refe~, in your own words, to 
some of the information outlined in the attached Enclosure No. 
2. It will not be helpful for _you to use our phraseology; for 
it is not desirable to have a ~umber of letters written in the 
same word$. We are also bringing· to your attention the at-
tached Enclosure No. l, outlining the necess~ry procedure ..... 
If you will employ your lawyer to draw up a brief for 
you, please wire us collect; and we will wire .additional data 
properly segregated, so that all briefs may not be prepared 
from the same approach ..... 
Prompt action·is the essence of the situation. Do riot 
delay, or permit your counsel to delay, because of length of 
time permitted for filing briefs or letters in proper form. 
The opinion in Washington will largely be guided by the imme-
diate and prompt response of the Shoe Manufacturing Industry 
to the announcement by the Secretary of State·that he intends 
to proceed with the negotiations with Czechoslovaiia, in spite 
of the many letters from Shoe Manufacturers and Shoe Workers 
of America who have protested the inclusion of shoes in the 
list of items to be negotiated. 
It is our opinion, however, that no good purpose will 
be served by mentioning this last point in your letter. As 
one of our Directors recently expressed it 1 Better let byg_ones 
be bygones, and not arouse unnecessary antagonismE; but repeat 
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our protests in proper form, even though we have to send a doz-
en sworn statements.t Neither will it be helpful to mention 
the National Boot and Shoe Manufacturers'.Association at this 
time. We shall probably find ourselves in a situation later o~ 
however, when we shall be compelled to ask your endorsement of 
the position of our .Association. 
In making use of this information, it is therefore sug-
gested that the order in which ideas and various points appear 
should be changed and that phraseology be in your own words. 
If sentences are copied in their present form, the effective-
ness of your letter will be lost." 
The greatest statistical error used in these letters 
and pamphlets was one of duplication. For example, if a dozen 
firms b:ild on a contract that was awarded to Bata, the actual 
amount of .American business lost to a foreign competitor would 
be multiplied by twelve. .Absurd as this condition may seem, 
the complaints of each domestic producer were presented at 
Washington. Even if all competitors did not register a com,-
plaint, it is easy to see how a comparatively few contracts 
awarded to Bata would result in an avalanche of letters to the 
committee on reciprocity • 
.A second type of misrepresentation employed was that 
·of comparing unlike quantities. The shoes imported from Czech-
oslovakia are all of a very inexpensive type designed to meet 
the needs of a certain limited market. It was shown in the 
1 above discussion of prices that type for type we were fairly 
capable of meeting foreign competiti·on. However, this country 
is the worldts largest manufacturer of shoes. We produce about 
400,000,000 pairs of shoes of which about 20% or 80,000,000* 
pairs of shoes enter into competition with the 3 ,_ooo ,000 pairs 
*Based upon U. S. production of cemented shoes--D. S. Tariff 
commission Memorandum July, 1937 
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imported from Czechoslovakia. The other 80% of our production, 
comprising some 320,000,000 pairs of shoes, is mostly of high-
er grade and therefore bear a higher unit cost. In spite of 
this condition the Statistical Department of the National Boot 
and Shoe Manufacturers Association have prepared a chart com-
paring the average price per pair of Czechoslovakian imports 
with the average price per pair of TOTAL American production.*' 
Relative to this chart, (a copy of which is included in the 
appendix, schedule # ) the association made the following com-
ment: 
"The striking difference in average value per pair of 
the American production compared with the average value per pai 
of imports from Czechoslovakia, requires no explanation as to 
the position in which the American Shoe Manufacturers find them 
selves relative to the character of Bata competition. This 
data is shown in proper ratio on the following chart." 
By working on this indefensible assumption that Bata 
is the most dangerous competitor of all shoe manufacturers, the 
manufacturing associations have drafted newspapers, chambers of 
commerce, labor unions and consumers in a nation-wide campaign 
against foreign-made shoes. The contributions of most states-
men toward this campaign were designed to appeal to the emo-
tions rather tpan the mind. The Ron. J. P .. Higgins in a recent 
article** continually pleaded that we ttprotect this _time-hon-
ored New England Industryn without giving any sound reason for 
the protection. Another article in the same magazine*** was 
entitled nuncle Sam, the Santa Claus of the Worldn because, for 
*Pamphlet presented by the N. B. & S. Mfg. Assoc. to the 
Committee on Reciprocity p. 23 
**N. E. Shoe Industry Imperilledn Protectionist p. 318 
***Page 309 September 1937 
the first time in 44 years, there was the possibility that we 
would have an unfavorable balance of trade~ Again, the news-
papers* quoted Senator Walsh as saying "this is a black day for 
those who earn their living by making shoesn and Rep. Connery 
who maintained that "our industries have been sold down the 
river. 11 After it was all over, however, Senator Walsh changed 
his attitude and s~id the "the agreement will not have the ad-
verse consequence on New England manufactures that had been 
feared.'' These quotations are merely given as indications of 
the~pe of propaganda used and of the success of the special 
interests in making themselves heard. 
Trend of the Shoe Industry 
The opposition to foreign-made goods created by this 
propaganda was augmented by economic conditions completely out-
side the scope of foreign competition. As we began to emerge 
from the last depression, production in certain industries, 
notably shoes and textiles, increased at a rate too swift to be 
maintained for any extended period of time. The reasons for 
this rapid increase were that there was a consumers' deficit to 
be filled and that goods were being produced for inventory pur-
poses. Increased inventories, in turn, were due to fear of 
labor trouble, rising prices, and forward buying for stock on 
the part of distributors. These factors resulted in 1936 be-
ing the best year the shoe industry had ever known. The year 
1937 showed even greater improvement until the last quarter. 
By this time a recession effecting all industry was well under 
*Boston Herald Marnh 9 1938 
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w~y. The Times Index of Total Production* dropped from a post-
depression high of 110 to below 80. This placed the shoe in-
dustry in a particularly vulnerable position for it was carry-
ing the largest inventories in its history. The low prices at 
the close of 1937 resulted in large inventory markdowns and un-
til these tremendous inventories could be worked off most shoe 
factories were obliged to reduce their working force or to tem-
porarily suspend all operations.** There are spectacular fig-
ures showing large numbers of failures of shoe companies. 
These figures, however, are misleading, because shoe companies 
fail and start over again where other industries would merely 
curtail operations. This is so because the shoe industry is 
comparatively easy ·to tTget in and out of. a It is merely neces-
sary to rent a loft and rent machinery requiring no large capi-
tal outlay. If net figur~s are considered, that is, the differ 
ence between new companies entering the field and old companies 
quitting~ shoe industry failures will not appear out of line 
with total business failures. While these conditions are not 
even remotely connected with Bata, the plight of the shoe com-
panies greatly increased the opposition to any increased shqe 
imports. 
Most of the talk against the trade agreement, then, was 
due to propaganda, misrepresentation and misunderstanding of 
the basic problem. The serious predicament of ~ few New Eng-
"(' 
land manufacturers has eroneously been taken as representative 
" 
*New York Sunday Times 
**Cleveland Trust Bulletin February 15, 1938 
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of the whole industry. These nweak si.sters rt of the shoe indus-
try have come to light because they could not stand the strain 
of the Great Depression and the present recession. Foreign-
made goods may be encroaching on their territory, to be sure, 
but. foreign competition is merely the spectacular or colorful 
denouement. The basic weakness of these companies is more far-
reaching. It is due to the fact that their whole economic or 
productive structure is out-moded; the competition is only the 
final straw. 
The shoe industry was founded in Massachusetts and New 
,/ . 
England still produces more shoes than any other section of the 
country, but with changing conditions the industry is gradually 
shifting to the mid-west. Years ago New England peddlers trans. 
ported and sold our shoes on the mid-west frontier. Later it 
became expedient for them to establish warehouses in Illinois 
and Missouri; that is, to develop wholesale houses out west. 
In time it became cheaper to manufacture, in these states, the 
type of shoe that could be sold by wholesale houses rather than 
ship them from New England. By the twentieth century the eco~ 
nomic advantages of the central states had become so important 
that this section of the country became New Englandrs largest 
competitor. The possession of cheap water power which had been 
the great advantage of New England was rendered unnecessary by 
~ the advent of electricity and oil. Illinois, located in the 
midst of the packing industry for her raw material and in the 
central part of the country for nation-wide distribution of 
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her shoes, became the countryrs second largest producer of 
shoes. Their newer plants and eauipment, designed for mass prol 
duction, are as efficient as those at Zlin. In a recent letter 
the Chamber of Commerce of St. Louis stated that they were not 
seriously affected by any competition, domestic or foreign. 
New England, on the other hand, has a tremendous investment in 
obsolete equipment. Many of its buildings, poorly lighted and 
, ventilated, are over fifty years old. They are not adapted to 
I 
the efficient arrangement of modern machinery, but encourage 
slow handling of materials, cluttered aisles, poor lighting 
and ventilation. According to twenty McGraw-Hill editors* 
there is much hard work still being performed that can be elim-
inated by mechanization. They also claim that much opportunity 
exists "for the development of a more continuous flow of work 
and progressive a·ssembly by the use of conveyers and other de-
vices. 11 The shoe industry, being an old industry has fostered 
institutions and traditions that are far behind the times. 
Personnel relationships and problems are poorly handled, work-
ing conditions have improved very showly and there remains the 
inherited feeling of paternalism, a legacy of a past generation 
This description is not of all New England, but of thosE 
concerns that have not kept up with the times; those in which 
there has been too much inbreeding and not enough new blood. 
These are the concer!ls that have ttgone undern and are being des 
I. cribed as the victims of unfair foreign competition. They have 
I 
I 
been suffering from strong competition for decades, but it has 
* Some impressions of Industrial New England p. 12 
been the more efficient mid-wastern states that have provided 
the competition and not the comparatively insignificant influx 
of foreign-made goods of recent years. 
Shifts in Comparoative Advantage 
New England has lost her comparative advantage in the 
manufacture of shoes, not to CzE:)_choslovakia, but to our own 
mid-west. This comparative advantage is based on efficiency of 
production. The important aspect of this particular compara~. 
tive advantage is that--not being based on any inherent quality 
of the land, resources or climate--it can be shifted from coun-
try to country with changing conditions. At the present time 
the efficiency of Czechoslovakia and the United States is al-
most the same. In each country one man can produce about 
twelve pairs of shoes a day. If the balance is to swing back 
to us, we must acquire more efficient methods of production. 
There is nothing in Bata's system that cannot be duplicated in 
this country. There is no unalterable element that makes 
Czechoslovakia a better place to produce shoes. If we do equip 
ourselves with methods and materials of production as efficient 
as those at Zlin, we will have the "edger' on Bata, for there 
are certain natural and artificial handic~ps that he cannot 
overcome. Czechoslovakian shoes must be ordered in the United 
States many months in advance of the season. This, in turn, 
increases the danger of frequent style changes expecially in 
women's shoes. There are also long freight hauls and duty 
charges to be met, and, most important of all, a natural sales'' 
resistance to be overcome. 
In comparing comparative advantages of these two coun-
tries, it should be borne in mind that the Bata organization 
has about reached its optimum of production. Their organiza-
tion has comprised the most modern and most efficient scheme of 
production that it is capable of producing. In this country, 
on the other hand, we have much room for improvement. Therefor 
if we can compete with them now, we should eventually be able 
to surpass them. For all these reasons, then, this country 
should have, on the whole, a slight advantage over Czechoslova-
kia in the production of shoes for domestic consumption. 
Results of This Trade Pact. 
There is little that can be said of the accomplish-
ments of this agreement. It has been in effect for but one 
year and it will be another year before a detailed break-down 
of our trade ~ith this country can be published. This conditio 
is due to the fact that much of our trade with Czechoslovakia 
passes through the free ports of Hamburg and Bremen and to some 
extent through Antwerp, Belgium, or Netherlands ports and there 
fore does not appear as shipments to .Czechoslovakia in the Unit' 
ed States statistics. Total American imports into Czechoslo-
vakia must, therefore, be compiled by that government and, as 
it requires a special study, the report is usually a year late. 
All that can be said is that in 1936, before the agreement was 
signed, we supplied that country with 10.3% of the country's 
total imports and imported 9.1% of her total exports, according 
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to the United States Chamber of Commerce Bulletin of October 6, 
1 1938, entitled uunited States Trade With Czechoslovakia.n 
There is some indication, at least, that shoe imports have mat-
erially decreased in the past year due to the reorganization of 
several Bata shoe factories for the production of military foot-
wear and harness and even airplanes. It appears that the home-
market has temporarily providEd a more profitable or more urgent 
demand for the products of the Zlin workshops. 
At the present writing it appears that there will be no 
further competition of Bata's shoes, at least from his Czecho-
slovakian factories. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia 
will automatically scrap the trade agreement for Germany is on 
our tariff 11black-li st. n That is, she is the only nation w.hi ch 
does not cooperate with our 11most-favored-nation 11 clause and is 
therefore subject to the old rates of the S~oot-Hawley tariff. 
It is legally possible t~at this might occasion greater imports 
of shoes into this country since the agreement set a quota on 
the importation of cemented shoes without lowering the rate. 
The abandonment of the treaty would permit unlimited importa-
tion of cementeq shoes at a 20% ad valorem duty. However, ther. 
are indications that the President will use the power granted 
him under the 1921 anti-dumping act and authorize a 25% counter 
vailing duty on all exports from Czechoslovakia.* This c~n be 
done on the premise that these goods will be subsidized by Ger-
many. If this is done it will provide, temporarily, almost 
*Boston Globe, March 18, 1939 
complete protection for the cheap-shoe manufacturers in the 
United States. 
It is impossible to say, at present, how much domestic 
manufactures stand to gain by the elimination of competition 
from Czechoslovakia. Competition from that source, as has al-
ready been shown, is almost entirely due to the efforts of Jan 
Bata. While Bata left, probably lost, his huge plants and the 
30,000 to 40,000 trained workers in his home country, he still 
has factories in England and chains of stores both in France 
and our own mid-west. It was announced that if the agreement 
is revoked it will be revoked only as to Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Slovakia. It would continue to apply to other nations effected 
by the treaty.* It is natural to expect that Mr. Bata will a-
vail himself of the opportunity (under the British trade agree-
ment and as a 11most-favored-nationrr) to reestablish himself as 
the world's greatest shoe manufacturer. It might be that in 
England he would not acquire a comparative advantage and would 
therefore not threaten domestic manufactures. Although this is, 
of course, all conjecture, it is likely that the British would 
be eager to supply the necessary capital for such a likely un-
dertaking. Another Zlin in England would give the British a 
big lever toward regaining some of the South American trade tha 
has been lost to Germany in recent years as well as a chance to 
help supply the American market. 
' *Boston Herald, March 18, 1939 
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Chapter 6 
Introduction 
The most recent and by far the most important aspect of 
our current trade policy is the trade agreement with the United 
Kingdom. It was shown in chapter three that our excessive 
Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 caused repercussions throughout the 
world. This tariff was partly responsible for the initiation 
of the Empire preference system of Great Britain. This Import 
Duties Act of 1932 provided for higher duties on goods origin-
ately outside of the British Empire. The act marked the aban-
donment of the substantial freedom of trade that had been prac-
tised by the United Kingdom for decades. Until this time her 
duties had been largely for revenue or to protect certain key 
industries. 
The nature of our trade was such that this preference 
system worked a particular hardship on us. The United Kingdom 
is our best customer, absorbing 18% of our total exports.* 
Considering imports, Canada supplies the greatest share of our 
foreign goods and the United Kingdom is in third place, supply-
ing between 6% and 8%** of our total imports. The total value 
of this trade amounted to $700,000,000 in 1937.*** 
*ttTrade of the United States With the United Kingdom,n 
ment of Commerce, p. 1 
**ibid 
***rtBritish-.Am.erican Trade Pacts, 11 Newsweek 11/28/38 p. 7 
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It is very difficult to measure the trend and extent of 
our trade with Great Britain, due partly to the volume of trans-
shipments included in trade statistics. Although the amount of 
tran~shipments has decreased in recent years, the limitations 
placed against imports of American goods by trade barriers and 
the relative scarcity of grains and meats in this country due 
to drought have been major factors in determining the extent of 
our exports. However, it is safe to say that our tariff of 
. 
1930 and the British tariff of 1932 seriously impeded trade be-
tween the two countries and caused incalculable economic loss. 
Since the depth of the Great Depression, our trade with 
the United Kingdom has increased over SO%. This increase in 
the face of such serious tariff barriers indicates the extent 
to which both nations could benefit from lower tariffs. That 
is, if we could sell Britain 20% of our total exports and were 
willing to buy from hers% of our total imports with the old 
tariff regulations; we both stand to gain a great deal by any 
action that tends to facilitate trade. 
Diplomatic Considerations 
The political aspects of this pact may prove more im-
portant than the economic gains. The economic effects may be 
easily exaggerated, but the diplomatic significance is surely 
the greatest in any agreement yet signed. The agreement had 
been pending for about nine months, but it was hurriedly com-
pleted soon after the Munich affair. The significance of time-
liness was probably not lost upon the power economies. 
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The strength of exclusive preferences and bi-lateral 
agreements has been weakened. As has been shown, totalitarian· 
states have demanded raw materials on a barter basis and exclu-
sive trade agreements from weaker nations. Since this policy 
conflicts with our most-favored-nation clause, these smaller 
nations must choose either agreements with the dictatorships or 
with the democracies. v JE.S If the former is chosen, the5 countr)' wil 
automatically be barred from two-thirds of the world's commerce. 
It is hoped that such a loss will prevent these weak nations 
from granting exclusive trade pacts. 
The above description is not to be taken as a solution 
to all international troubles; it is mostly conjecture as to 
what might happen. To be sure, these countries must make a 
choice between the two policies of foreign trade, but there is 
no assurance that the choice will be for increased trade. It 
is not exactly a free choice since the geographical position of 
some of these countries makes war an ever-present danger. In 
m 
some cases exclusive agreements have already been consumated, 
1\ 
and it may be impossible or at least inexpedient to change the 
policy. On the other hand, this so-called united front of 
democracies may cause, in retaliation, a united front of die-
tatorships. A bloc of power economies could offer more favora-
ble trade programs to weaker nations than they now have. There 
is, of course, no way of determining the length of time, but 
such a line-up might continue for many years. 
The totalitarian states, and especially Germany, have 
been hit by this agreement in another way. We have granted con 
cessions to the United Kingdom on commodities that these other 
e countries are also trying to sell to us. The German exports 
most likely to suffer will include* toys, vegetable oils, elec-
trical machinery, and the glass, shoe and textile industries 
acquired from Czechoslovakia. 
Another political aspect of this agreement deals with 
our pledge of access to raw materials needed for defense prepar 
ations. Although Article XVI of the agreement**states that the 
concessions shall not be extended to conflict with our neutrali 
ty laws, one of the notes attached to the agreement promises 
that the emergency exchange of raw materials for defense pur-
poses will be facilitated.*** 
The Agreement Itself 
The trade agreement between the United States and the 
United Kingdom became effective January 1, 1939 for an inital 
period of three years, but it may continue in force indefinitely, 
thereafter subject to termination on a six-month notice by eith-
er country. It includes not only trade with Great Britain but 
also Newffoundland and over fifty non-self-governing British 
colonies. The chief colonies included in the agreement are 
Malaya, Ceylon, the African Gold Coast and Nigeria, British West 
~ri tish-American Trade Pacts, n Newsweek 11/28/38 p. 8 
**nText of the Trade Agreement Between the United States and 
the United Kingdom,n Department o:f State, Article XVI 
***ibid Attached note of 11/17/38 addressed to Sir Ronald Lind-
say, British Ambassador 
Indies and Bermuda. The important parts of the British Empire 
not included are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Ireland, India and Burma.~~ 
Scope of the Agreement 
Before considering the individual concessions it would 
be wise to gain some conception of the scope of the agreement 
and the type of commodities involved. For reasons mentioned a-
bove, 'it is difficult to determine the extent of the concess-
ions granted and received. The following statistics are based 
on 1936 trade, the last year for which a complete analysis is 
available. The total trade on which reductions, bindings and 
improved quota treatment has been secured amounted to about 
$675,000,000-;:-~f- in 1936. Our exports to the United Kingdom a-
mount to $463,000,000 on which concessions (including reduc-
tions, bindings and improved quota treatment) amounted to about 
;~300,000,000. Of this total $200,000,000-:lHH~ was composed of ex-'-
ports of agricultural products. 
Actual reductions were obtained on exports of $50,000,00 
of which $26,000,000-lH~ was represented by agricultural products. 
The importance of the agricultural concessions is especially 
understated by these figure~ due to the abnormally small trade 
in these goods in 1936. The drought, crop curtailment programs, 
-;} 11Trade Agreement With the United Kingdom, 11 Department of 
State, p. l 
-:lHf-ibid p. 4 
-:HH<-uSurnmary of Trade Agreement Between United States and United 
Kingdom, 11 Department of Commerce, p. ll 
,-
and restrictive duties so limited trade in that year that the 
probable extent of these concessions is not properly shown. 
However, the year 1936 must be used for comparison since other 
years would present other, more indefinite variables. The re-
ductions were less comprehensive than would have been the case 
had the agreement not been formulated in the midst of a depres-
sion. However, some inroads have been made on the' Empire pre-
ference system and this may lead to further concessions in the 
future. 
The rates were bound on exports of $250,000,000 of which 
$190,000, 000~*- were .American farm-products. These bindings are 
more important than they appear at first inspection. Many of 
them represent lower rates granted by the United Kingdom in a-
greements with other countries. The binding of the rates to 
the United States insures us that they will remain at their pre 
1 
sent status at the expiration of the agreements which originall 
caused the reductions. 
During 1937 our imports from the United Kingdom amounted 
to $200,000,000 on which were granted concessions (reductions 
and bindings) amounting to $141,500,000. Of this latter figure, 
duties were reduced on $59,900,000; bound at existing rates on 
$42,000,000; and bound on the free list on $39,500,000.~H} 
A most significant aspect of this trade is that it in-
eludes such a wide range of.cornrnodities. With the exception of 
~~-ibid p. l 
-:H~i bid p. 8 
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whiskey, which equals 15% of our total imports, only 6 items 
amount to as much as 2% of the total imports. The same condi-
tion exists in our exports. Except for cotton and tobacco, 
which together amount to 33% of our exports, there are only 6 
items amounting to as much as 2% of the tota1.1~ 
Concessions Granted 
The concessions granted to Great Britain were largely 
on manufactured goods while the concessions allowed to the col-
onies dealt largely with raw materials. The important items 
were~~textiles, metals and metal products, leather products, 
specialized machinery and various luxury goods. The reductions 
> 
were largely on complementary rather than directly competitive 
goods. Many of the reductions were on higher priced and better 
quality goods than it is customary for us to produce. In many 
instances imports have equalled all, or nearly all of the con-
sumption, because of the lack of domestic producers. In such 
cases there can be but little, if any, harm done to our indus-
try. 
Exports Expected to Benefit 
Agricultural exports are expected to benefit most from 
this agreement. For example, duties were abolished on~H~wheat, 
lard, and certain fruit juices. Corn, cotton, hams and certain 
e other pork products were bound on the free list. Reductions 
-l~ 11 Trade of the United States with the United Kingdom, 11 Depart-
ment of commerce p. 1 
~~-;*' 11The Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom, 11 Department of 
8tat-~6-- ____!J'--ab-l.e~-d 4 n 1 0-9-=.J,W 
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were acquired for apples, pears, rice, and certain canned fruit 
Certain advantages were also given to our manufactures; chief 
among these being office machinery and equipment, silk hosiery, 
electrical appliances, and many wood and paper products.?~ The 
benefits to our important agricultural products will be anal-
ysed in a later section. 
Trade with Newfoundland 
A special part of the agreement dealt with our trade 
with Newfoundland, which, for the year ending June 30, 1938, 
amounted to $7,47.7,000.?~ Of this trade, concessions amount-
ing to ~~3,979,000 were obtained for our tobacco, flour, salted 
beef, salted pork, automobile and radio parts and some tex-
tiles.?~ In return we have allowed reductions on frozen blue-
berries and certain salt fish which are of special importance 
to that country. 
Possible Economic Effects on Agriculture 
The agreement may improve the position of our _farm pro-
ducts, but it does not solve our most pressing agricultural 
problems. British imports of American cotton were bound on the 
free list, but there is little reason to expect that we can sel 
more cotton. 
There is a plan in Congress?:-.;~ whereby an export subsidy 
1(- 11 The Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom, 11 Department of' 
State - 1256, Tables l and 4, pages 109-170; Schedule £, 
page 122 
-lH(-New York Times, March 26, 1939 
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of lii per pound may be granted to help move our surplus cot-
ton. It will be difficult to move this surplus by such a mea-
. 
sure in the face of restrictions from foreign countries, other 
the Great Britain, regardless of price. It amounts to an un-
economic giving away of values and is likely to create friction 
and retalitory measures. The world price of the staple will 
have to fall, in fact, it has already fallen l/2i-><- in anticipa-
tion of what may happen. In fact, it would seem that the Unit-
ed Kingdom would be justified in placing a duty on our cotton 
equal to the subsidy, for the agreement did not contemplate 
dumping of surpluses. Regardless of the action taken by Great 
Britain, the agreement will not help move our cotton surplus of 
11,250,000 bales • .,H" 
In this same connection, it must be remembered that our 
imports of British cotton goods are running well ahead of last 
year's figures. In order to safe-guard domestic manufacturers 
it would be necessary to make an agreement with Great Britain 
that cotton purchased under subsidy arrangements could not be 
manufactured and sold here under the trade agreem~nt. If this 
prohibition were made Great Britain would purchase other cot-
ton at the new low world price in order to maintain her market 
here ~or manufactured goods. Thus, it is possible that we may 
sell Britain less rather than more cotton. 
->~New York Times, March 26, 1939 
?H*'ibid 
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Since November 17, 1932 there has been a duty.on non-
Empire wheat of' 2 shillings per quarter of' 480 pounds,~~ or ap-
proximately 6¢ per bushel. The abolition of' this duty should 
place American wheat in a better competitive position. However 
the restricted output of' the domestic staple, due to circum-
stances already explained, makes it difficult f'or us to meet 
the prices of' Continental, South American and Australian wheat 
growers. Our trouble is that, at present, we cannot meet world 
prices and are therefore not in a position to take advantage of' 
the British concession. In fact, our government is losing 25¢ 
a bushel on its preseht wheat subsidy in an attempt to move a 
surplus of' 100,000,000 bushels. ool:-.;~o 
Before the Import Duties Act of' 1932, we shipped to 
Great Britain l/4 of' our total wheat exports or, expressed an-
other way, l/5 of' her total wheat imports. This usually a-
mounted to about 40,000,000 bushels. In 1933 we were able to 
export only 9,000 bushels or l/20 of' 1% of' the United Kingdomts 
requirements. Our ability to re-acquire our old wheat market 
will depend largely on our ability to cut our relative cost of' 
wheat production to something like its former level. As was 
the case with cotton, at present this concession cannot mean a 
great deal to American farmers. 
The concessions granted to the United States·on meats 
~ and related products, on the other hand, will probably have im-
~E-nThe Trade Agreement With the United Kingdom, 11 Department of' 
State, p. 109, Table l 
?HE-New York Times, March 26, 1939 
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mediate effects on our trade. Generally speaking, pork and 
allied products are in the best position to benefit imraediatel~ 
from the agreement. Most of these products have been on the 
free list, but have been subject to import quotas. 
The quota on hams1} has been set at 56,000,000 pounds for 
the first year, with the possibility for possible future in-
creases. Except for the periods of drought and the A. A. A., 
the existing quota had been definitely restrictive. Now that 
production has again resumed normal capacity; the hog producers 
of the Middle West stand to gain considerably. The importance 
of this item can be better appreciated when one realizes that 
normally the United Kingdom absorbs 85% of our exports, which 
equals about 50% of her imports of this commodity. 
Allied products such as pigs 1 tongues, pigs 1 feet, edi-, 
ble offal, and chilled and frozen pork have received similar 
advantages. Pigs 1 tongues in airtight containers had been tax-
ed 10% and the rate is now bound; other than that, these items 
are bound on the free list, with more liberal quotas. The re-
moval of the 10% ad valorem duty on lard should enable our do-
mestic lard to make substantial gains in this market. We are 
the world's largest producer and exporter of lard. Our imports 
into the United Kingdom of this item have been constantly in-
cr~asing in spite of the .duty, so that in 1934 we were supply-
~ ing that country with 92% of her total lard requirements. Thie 
?*" 11 Text of the Trade Agreement Between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 11 Department of State, Schedule l, Section A 
p. 10 
11 c:; 
figure has dropped considerably, due to domestic problems, but 
there is now an opportunity for immediate increase in trade in 
this item. 
Possible Economic Effects On Manufactures 
For several reasons our vast machine and tool industries 
will not be seriously effected. The types of machines and the 
reductions allowed include certain kinds of sewing machines 
(from 30% to 15%;) lacing, knitting, and braiding machines 
(from 40% to 20%;) certain textile machinery (from 40% to 25%;) 
and internal-combustion engines (from 27~% to 17~%. )?~ Total 
imports of machinery are very small compared to domestic pro-
duction, and, because of ;their particular construction will 
i 
never threaten American industry. Most of these imports may be 
classified under three headings:?:·-~ ( 1) Machinery never import-
ed to any great extent because of superior domestic manufacture 
such as sewing machines; (2) Those machines always imported be-
cause there are no domestic producers, such as certain kinds of 
textile machinery; and (3) obsolete parts used ~or replacement 
which, in the United States, are subject to the same rates of 
duty as the machines themselves. From the foregoing analysis 
of our machinery imports it can be readily seen that there will 
be no serious loss on this score, to domestic manufacturers. 
Perhaps the most controversial schedule was that of tex-
* 11 The Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom, 11 Department of 
State p. 83, paragraph #372 
?H:-i bid p. 82 
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tiles; but, as in the case of Czech shoes, the complaints were 
largely unfounded. In the following paragraphs are listed the 
most important reductions and bindings granted on textiles and 
their products. 
The duties on wool products are of the compound type, 
described in chapter two. Since the duties on raw wool were 
not changed, reductions were made only on the ad valorem part 
of the duty. Reductions averaging about 25% were granted, but 
these changes apply largely to articles of high quality not 
generally produced in the United States. 
For example, on woven fabrics not weighing more than 4 
ounces per square yard, the ad valorem portion of the rate was 
reduced by l/10 on the lowest value bracket and by about 2/5 
on the highest value bracket. This is not a special case,for 
imports of this item amount to 45% of our total British imports 
of wool manufactures. Similar treatment granted on wool knit 
goods and other wool wearing apparel account for an additional 
25% of our imports on this tariff schedule. Most of these ap-
parel items are non-competing British specialties. 
Imports of heavy weight fabrics weighing more than 4 
ounces per square yard and falling under paragraph 109 A, equal 
less than l% of our production. These cloths were divided into 
four price ranges and reductions ranging from about 10% on the 
.tt lowest to about 25% on the highest price classification. There 
were reductions granted on the cheaper fabrics, but most of 
them were reductions in the compensatory specific duty. Such 
117 
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a reduction is consistent with the lowering of the duties on 
wastes. 
The same general conditions exist in respect to cottons: 
reductions granted were largely on cloth of the higher-price 
range, and on yarns of the finer counts. Imports of British 
yarn have amounted to less than 1% of our production because 
these imports were of yarns finer than 60, whereas the bulk of 
our domesticmnsumption is of counts of 40 o~ lower. 
the reductions are graded: the lower the count; the 
Here agai 
gre~ter I 
the duty. 
The reductions on greigh cloth apply only to cloth val-
ued at more than 70i a pound, which is a relatively high price 
for cotton greigh goods. Most reductions on cotton cloth a-
mount to about 25%. There was one reduction, however, that 
will probably directly affect domestic producers. In 1936 the 
President increased the rates on low count (31 to· 50) cotton, 
now reductions are in effect on these counts amounting to about 
48%, if the cloth is valued over a certain amount. 
The United States is the world's greatest producer of 
cotton cloth, but over 90% of it is ·of counts lower than 40. 
As was explained in an earlier chapter, duties on goods which 
are on an export basis will, in the long rLUl, have no effect; 
providing the goods applicable to the duty and the exported 
e goods are identical. Cotton cloth is on an export basis :in 
this country. However the amount of imports is insignificant, 
whether they be considered identical and competing, or merely 
I 
I 
_]_1 A 
complimentary .• Imports in the past have equaled less than 2/10 
of 1% of domestic consumption. 
Summary 
The statistics and articles published since the agree-
ment became effective are entirely unfair, some of them are 
definitely misleading. Edward F. Walker, secretary-treasurer 
of the Rhode Island Textile Association prepared a statement 
intended to show the loss due to the pact.~} He claimed that 
the increase in imports in January represented ~4.00 a week 
from the payroll of every woolen textile worker for a month. 
Such a statement is an obvious misrepresentation of existing 
conditions. It is impossible to determine how Mr. Walker de-
termined a rate of $4.00 a week, but he mis-stated the cause of 
the increase in imports. There was an increase in January of 
oyer 100% of the figure for the same month of 1938, but this 
was caused by the fact that most orders were held up during the 
last part of 1938, pending signing of the agreement. The great 
influx of goods in January was caused by a hand-to-mouth buying 
policy late in 1938. Without doubt, when the statistics for 
February, 1939 are published, they will show a definite drop 
in imports. 
Criticism of a particular pact has usually died down . 
after the agreement has had a chance to operate. It is only in 
industries where there are vested interests of organized manu-
facturers and organized labor, (as in shoes and textiles) that 
ii'Boston Traveler, March 16, 1939 
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unjust criticism continues. This attitude is strikingly dif-
ferent from that taken by the automobile industry. Although 
disappointed in not obtaining lower duties on their exports, 
the industry had no criticism to make. It felt that if the a-
greement benefited the farmers, it would cause more sales of 
cars in agricultural districts, which would be the same as sell 
ing cars in the U:hi ted Kingdom.->*' 
One further criticism·:Hl- proffered by the Cotton Thread 
Institute was that Japan would take advantage of the new rates, 
as a subscriber to our most favored-nation-clause, and flood 
our market with cheap goods. What danger there may be in this 
direction has been greatly over-stated, for in 1936 Japan fur-
nished only 3.2% of the treaty items. In conclusion, it should 
be remembered that those industries which must meet increased 
competition have probably benefited from other agreements. At 
least they will benefit from increased domestic markets due to 
the general expansion of the farm industries. 
->*' 11 Close Greatest Tariff Deal, 11 Business Week, 11/26/38 p. 7 
->Hl- 11 The British Trade Pact, 11 The Nation, December 3, 1938 p. 12 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The following pages will be colored somewhat by my per-
sonal opinions and observations. In the body of this thesis~ 
there was described the growth of our current trade policies. 
It was shown how the high tariffs of the last decade brought 
lL 
forth retalitory measures, which; together with the self-suffi-
A. 
, ciency programs of Europe~ necessitated a reversal of our tarif 
policy. It was also shown how this reversed policy instigated 
a reciprocal trade program and the extent to which this program 
has been carried. Yet there seem to be, some very basic con-
cepts that should be used to guide our future trade policies 
that have not received proper attention. 
Francis Sayre once wrote~?*- 11 Because of the uneven geo-
graphical distribution of natural resources throughout the wor 
because of the wide variations among all countries in climates, 
in racial aptitudes~ in trade conditions, certain nations excel 
in the production of some commodities, others in different ones. 
This has brought about the development of international trade. 
Trade has always been an enric.hing as well as a civilizing in-
f'luence. 11 This statement sums up brief'ly the argument for in-
creased foreign trade, and in my opinion it should be· our guid-
tA W1 ing principle. 
All federal administrations, of course, have been inter-
~~ 11 Trade by Treaties, 11 Francis B. Sayre~ Current History January 
1' 1939' p .14 
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ested in increasing trade, but most efforts have been concen-
trated in moving export surpluses of' one sort or another. Even 
the reciprocal trade agreement program seems more interested in 
securing a greater excess of' exports to, over imports from, 
agreement countries. All government statistics on the subject 
are designed to show the relative gain of' exports over imports 
without considering that under present conditions we should im-
port more than we export. We are the world's largest creditor 
nation and if foreign trade is to be reestablished on a sound 
basis provision must be made for the payment of' amounts due us. 
This continual seeking for an excess of' exports dates back to 
the days of' mercantilism, and should have no place in determin-
ing present trade policies. 
This nurturing of' exports aids business, but gives no di-
rect aid to the people as a whole. This cynical neglect of' con-
sumer interest is, in the long run, a definite indication of' 
poor planning. In so far as trade agreements, or any trade poli 
cy attempts to encourage exports over imports it is considering 
only apparent immediate national interests and the ultimate ef-
fects are apt to be far different from those intended. Further 
excesses of exports over imports will augment rather than help 
our present condition. Our only benefit from increased for-
eign trade can c·ome from an increase in available connnodi.tie s 
e and not from an increase in credits due us from abroad. From 
this one should not infer that our present program does not en-
courage imports, but merely that undue streffi seems to be placed 
- r-· 
on the selling of our goods in foreign markets. Nor should it 
be assumed that a sweeping reduction in duties is desirable 
since this would not increase foreign trade enough. In view of 
foreign import quotas and restrictions, the bargaining for con-
cessions is the only workable plan. 
Considering the other aim of our present policy, it is 
quite true that until our present efforts to liberalize world 
trade are successful and until we have overcome the inherent 
dangers of economic nationalism) economic and political struggle 
will continue accompanied by more suspicion and hostility. Ho~ 
ever, this whole plan is predicated on the assumption that we 
alone can enlist the nations of the world in freeing trade and 
in allowing themselves to become dependent on their neighbors 
for certain commodities. Since this plan is diametrically op-
posed to the philosophies of many countries today, is it certain 
that we shall ever obtain sufficient cooperation? Isn't it pos-
sible that these power economies may form a bloc among them-
selves to combat our program? 
These questions merely present possibilities of future 
action. To date it would oppear that our program is, on the 
whole, fairly successful. We have secured the cooperation of 
l9 countries covering 60% of our foreign trade, and our trade 
with these countries has materially increased over the trade 
with non-agreement countries. The eventual success of the poli-
tical aspects of the program depends on a factor partly beyond 
its control. This factor being the length of time these power 
economies can maintain their aims of self-sufficiency and eco-
nomic independence of nations or at least group of nations. It 
is possible that this philosophy might become the dominant poli 
cy of the world for a long time to come. 
These doubts cast upon the success of the diplom~tic as-
' pect of the trade program are but conjectures as to what might 
happen and should not be construed as an attack upon the trade 
agreement program as a whole. The economic and social problems 
now facing the United States are the same as those that have 
faced Europe for some time. They are problems requiring some 
degree of economic planning and are not soluble by laissez-fair 
tactics alone. This change in our international relations is a 
step in the direction of national planning and the reciprocal 
trade agreement program represents a more finished and intelli-
gent technique than has ever been displayed before. 
Digest 
The tariff policy of the United States has been predi-
cated upon a number of factors. .It is partly the outgrowth of 
business conditions 7 political expediency, and the nature of 
the predecessor tariff. The predecessor tariff in turn, was 
dependent on conditions existing at the time it was inaugurated 
Therefore, it is necessary to review the elements affecting all 
tariff~ as well as the composition of the various tariffs, in 
order to appreciate the present tariff policies of the United 
States. 
During the various periods of our history, differing 
elements were most important in establishing the nature of each 
tariff. For example 7 during the early period of our history 
·the need of revenue was the chief factor in determining the ex-
tent of the duties. Again, with the gradual development of 
domestic manufactures, the element of protection was injected 
as a consideration in establishing tariff rates. This is first 
seen in Hamil ton 1 s analysis of the value of. a 11home-market 11 for 
our manufactures. 
It is interesting to note that, generally speaking, the 
close of prosperity periods and the cessation of military con-
flicts have generally caused agitation for higher tariffs. 
This has been the case from the depression of 1837 to the close 
of the last prosperous decade; and from the close of the War of 
-- 1---
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1812 to the close of the World War. To a large extent these 
higher tariffs were demanded to protect over-expanded and high-
cost producers. One further observation on the past trend of 
our tariffs might be that it is easier to raise than to lower 
tariff rates. In the past tariffs have been raised with far 
less opposition than was met in attempts to lower rates. It 
has sometimes taken a generation to lower the excessive rates 
of a particular tariff; a condition due, no doubt, to the unit-
ed front presented by vested interests. 
The above-mentioned effect of business cycles and wars 
on the level of tariff duties is admirably shown by our high 
tariffs of 1921 and 1930. These extremely high rates invited 
retaliation from abroad and our foreign trade was greatly cur-
tailed. Again, during this last decade the development of na-
tional socialistic governments and the policies of self-contain 
ment and isolation have further increased the barriers to trade. 
Much of the world trade was curtailed by bi-lateral trade agre~ 
ments, quota systems and other import restrictions. These con-
trols are used to a large extent by power economies, ostensibly 
to obtain sources of raw materials and war supplies but often 
to gai? economic and political control of weak nations. Pre-
paration for or against war tended to increase these controls 
and forced many nations to think in terms of war needs rather 
4IJ than the welfare of their people. 
The effect of these world conditions on our foreign 
I trade policy was the opposite to that of most countries. In 
1934 an act was passed giving the President the power to nego-
tiate reciprocal trade agreements. The purpose of these agree-
ments was two-fold. First, to reduce the strangle-hold on 
world trade caused by the operation of self-containment poli-
cies; second, to promote world peace by creating an inter-de-
pendency among nations and a renewal of feelings of good-will. 
The serious condition of our export industries was the basic 
reason for the trade agreement plan. ·The 11 save-the-world 11 at-
titude of this plan is a contribution of Secretary of State 
Hull, which, incidentally, effectively forestalls much of the 
criticism of the plan. There is unjustifiably the stigma of 
being an isolationist or a war-monger attributed to one who 
does not support a program in any way connected with peace. 
From this I do not mean to infer that both aims of the plan are 
not valid. The agreements are a long-run program, the benefits 
of which, if ever measurable, will not be completely felt for 
years to come. 
The agreements with Czechoslovakia and the United King-
dom are examples of the most recent trade pacts. The Czech a-
greement, now defunct, was designed to give aid to the only 
democracy left in Central Europe. The concessions granted had 
no startling effects on our trade. This was due to the facts: 
(1) that the agreement was in effect for only a little more 
than a year, (2) that Czechoslovakia was in no position to de-
velop her exports and was interested largely in importing war 
materials, and (3) that the current depression has had a dead-
-t -·~~==================================~~-~=~~=~~====~==l~Q~A·== 
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ening effect on all trade. 
The British agreement has been called nthe world's great-
est trade agreement. 11 It is, of course, impossible even to 
estimate the diplomatic and economic effects this agreement will 
have, in view of unsettled international conditions. The agre~ 
ment is concerned with trade amounting to about $700,000,000. 
but the concessions deal with such a large variety of goods that 
no particular industry will suffer greatly. Most of the con-
cess~ons deal with complementary and supplementary commodities 
rath~r than directly competitive goods. 
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Equivalent Ad Valorem Rates.on Dutiable Merchandise Under Tar-
iff Acts of 1922 and 1930 Based on Imports of 1928~!-
Chemicals, oils, & paints 
Earths, earthenware, & ·glassware 
Metals & manufactures of 
Wood & manufactures of 
Sugar, molasses & manufactures of 
Tobacco & manufactures of 
Agricultural products & provisions 
Spirits, wines, & other beverages 
Manufactures of cotton 
Flax, hemp, & jute & manufactures of 
Wool & manufactures of 
Manufactures of silk 
Manufactures of rayon or other 
synthetic textiles 
Paper & books 
Sundries 
Act of 
% 
30 
49 
34 
25 
68 
63 
23 
39 
40 
18 
50 
57 
52 
25 
37 
Total ••••••••••••••.•••••••.• 38. 
1922 Act of 
% 
36 
54 
35 
12 
'7'7 
65 
35 
47 
46 
19 
60 
59 
54 
26 
28 
41 
1930 
..J.'-U. S. Tariff Commission, "Comparison of Rates of Duty in the 
Tariff Act of 1930 and in the Tariff Act of 1922 11 p. 2 
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Relative Importance o.f Czech Imports 
Czecho-
u. s. slovakian 
Year Production Imports Percent 
1927 5,670,000 
1928 6,730,000 
1929 371,519,000 5,164,000 1.39 
1930 304,170,000 3,070,000 1.01 
1931 315,456,000 3,570,000 1.13 
1932 . 313,290,000 2,182,000 .69 
1933 350,382,000 2,055,000 .58 
1934 357,119,000 2,218,000 .62 
1935 383,761,000 1,602,000 .42 
1936 415,227,000 2,135,000 .51 
1937 411,969,000 2,725,000 .74 
Compiled .from the Import Statistics o.f the Department o.f Com-
merce, and the production .figures o.f the Census o.f Manu.factures 
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Trend of United States Tariff Rates 
% % Equivalent 
Year Free Dutiable Total Duties Collected Ad VaJ.. Rates 
(In Thousands) Free F. & D. 
Underwood Law 10/4/13 
1914 60.4 39.6 1,906,400 283,512 37.6 14.9 
1915 62.7 37.3 1,648,386 205,755 33.4 12.5 
1916 68 ... 6 31.4 2,179,035 209,523 30.7 9.6 
1917 69.5 30.5 2,667,220 221,448 27.2 8.3 
1918 72.9 27.5 4,317,855 254,014 24.3 5.8 
1919 70.8 29.2 3,827,683 237,403 21.3 6.2 
1920 61.1 38.9 5,101,823 325,635 16.4 6.4 
1921 61.2 38.8 2,556,870 292,359 29.4 11.4 
1922 61.4 38.6 3,073,773 451,356 38.1 14.7 
Ave. 66.3 33.7 2,871,479 261,168 27 9.1 
Fordney-McCurnber 9/22/22 
1923 58 42 3,731,770 566,664 36.2 15.2 
1924 59.2 40.8 3,575,111 532,286 36.5 14.9 
1925 64.9 35.1 4,176,218 551,814· 37 .. 6 13.2 
1926 66 34 4,408,076 590,038 39.3 13.4 
1927 64.4 35.6 4,163,090 574,839 38.8 13.8 
1928 65.7 34.3 4,077,937 542,270 38.8 13.3 
1929 66.4 33.6 4,388,572 584,772 40.1 13.6 
}930 64.6 35.4 1,705,998 269,359 44.6 15.8 
2 yr 
Ave. 63.8 36.2 4,023,570 561,606 38.5 14 
Smoot-Hawley 6/18/30 
±930 69.5 30.5 1,409,079 192,528 44.8 13.7 
2 yr . 
1931 66.6 33.4 2,088,455 370,771 53.2 17.8 
1932 66.8 33.2 1,325,093 259,600 59.1 19.6 
1933 63.1 36.9 1,433_,013 283,681 53.6 19.8 
e • 
Adapted from 11 Tariff and Its History11 p. 80 
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United States Production and Imports of 
Commodity 
Butter 
Cream 
Cattle 
Hams, should-
ers, bacon 
Corn 
Cotton Cloth 
Wool Cloth 
Shoes 
Cement 
Soft wood 
lumber 
Machine-made 
wool rugs 
Plate glass 
Window glass 
Specified Commodities in Recent Years.JI-
Year Unit U. S. Production Imports Ratio 
1937 lb. 1,611,395,000 10,259,712 .64 
1937 gal. 980,000,000 136,622 .01 
1936 head 16,176,000 341,799 2.11 
1936 lb. 3,900,000,000 26,009,706 .67 
1937 bu. 2,644,995,000 86,286,761 3.26 
1937 
1937 
1937 
1937 
1936 
1935 
1937 
1937 
sq. y~ 8,500,000,000 143,889,852 1.69 
lb. 250,000,000 
pr. 411,000,000 
bbl. 116,475,000 
M ft. 20,000,000 
sq. yd. 58,684,000 
sq. ft. 192,592,600 
lb. 936,966,000 
5,603,492 2.24 
3,810,000 .93 
1,779,000 1.53 
580,000 2.90 
915,455 1.56 
2,059,833 1.07 
46,055,740 4.92 
1l-The Consequences of Trade Barriers 11 The Annals of the Ameri-
~ can Academy, July, 1938 p. 40 
United States Production and Exports of 
Specified Commodities in 1929 and 1937 
Commodit'l 
Raw Cotton 
Leaf Tobacco 
Lard 
Rice 
Wheat and Flour 
Apples 
Sulphur, crude 
Automobiles 
Commodity 
Raw Cotton 
Leaf Tobacco 
Lard 
Rice 
Wheat and Flour 
Apples 
Sulphur, crude 
Automobiles 
1929" 
Unit 
1,000 bales 
1,000,000 lbs. 
It 
rr 
1,000,000 bu. 
rr 
1,000 tons 
thousands 
1937 
Unit 
1,000 bales 
1,000,000 lbs. 
II 
II 
1,000,000 bu. 
If 
l,OOO tons 
thousands 
Production Exports 
14,828 7,581 
1,500 555 
1,763 830 
1,149 315 
809 154 
143 13 
1,990 855 
5,358 536 
Production Exports 
18,746 6,023 
1,506 418 
787 137 
1,500 200 
873 42 
211 7 
2,100 650 
4,800 400 
Ratio 
51.1 
:37.0 
47.0 
~7.4 
1§.0 
8.9. 
43.0 
10.0 
Ratio 
32.1 
27.8 
17.4 
13.3 
4.8 
3.4 
31.0 
8.3 
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Nations With Whom We Have Had Trade Ag:t>eements 
.•. 
'. 
·.:· 
Canada 
France 
.Brazil 
Belgium 
Cu1:;>a 
swctJi~ 
, .Haiti 
Colrilnoia 
Costa Rioa 
Guatemala 
Switzerland 
Ho.ndura.s 
Netb.er1ands 
Finland 
Nic~ragua 
El Salvaqor 
Czechoslovakia 
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